University of Mississippi

eGrove
Statements of Position

American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection

1992

Proposed statement of tax policy 10 : integration of the corporate
and shareholder tax systems ;Integration of the corporate and
shareholder tax systems; Exposure draft (American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants), 1992, Dec. 7
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Tax Division

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_sop
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Tax Division, "Proposed statement of tax policy 10 :
integration of the corporate and shareholder tax systems ;Integration of the corporate and shareholder tax
systems; Exposure draft (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants), 1992, Dec. 7" (1992).
Statements of Position. 576.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_sop/576

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) Historical Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Statements of Position by an
authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

EXPOSURE DRAFT
PROPOSED STATEMENT OF
TAX POLICY 10
INTEGRATION OF THE CORPORATE AND
SHAREHOLDER TAX SYSTEMS
DECEMBER 7, 1992

Prepared by the Tax Division of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

Comments should be received by January 15, 1993 and addressed to
Carol B. Ferguson, Technical Manager, Tax Division
AICPA, 1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20004

SUMMARY

This proposed statement of tax policy (STP) presents recommendations for improving the system
of taxing corporate-source earnings.
Statements of Tax Policy of the Tax Division are issued for the general information of those
interested in the subject. They are intended to aid in the development of federal tax legislation in
directions that the division believes are in the public interest.
This exposure draft has been sent to —
•

Members of the AICPA Board of Directors.
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Members of the AICPA Tax Division.
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•
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STATEMENT OF TAX POLICY

INTRODUCTION
0.1
This statement of tax policy presents the recommendations of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) for improving the system of taxing corporate-source
earnings. These recommendations are based in part on a reconsideration of the 1975 edition of
Statement of Tax Policy 3, Elimination of the Double Tax on Dividends, which was adopted by the
AICPA Tax Division.
0.2
Statements of tax policy are adopted by a two-thirds vote of the AlCPA's Tax Executive
Committee, after having been initially approved by the Tax Policy and Planning Committee. The
statements represent the AlCPA's view on key policy issues. The conclusions reached in the
statements are based on conditions existing at the time the statements are issued. The AICPA
periodically reviews and, if necessary, reissues or revises outstanding tax policy statements. Since
the economic and legislative environment existing when a statement is issued can change
dramatically in a relatively short time, it is possible that the statement may, at any given point, no
longer represent the AlCPA's views. Thus, the reader should check with the AICPA Tax Division
to determine the current status of this statement.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
0.3
In 1975, the Tax Division of the AICPA first studied the issue of eliminating the double tax
on dividends through integration of the corporate and shareholder income taxes. At that time, the
AICPA published its findings in Statement of Tax Policy 3, which recommended the adoption of
an integration system that employed either the dividends-paid deduction method or the
shareholder-credit method.
0.4
Since that time, the economic conditions and tax laws in the United States have changed
significantly. The changes have generated renewed interest in examining the feasibility of
integrating the corporate and individual tax systems. Relevant changes include the growth of
international trade and competition, the increased use of debt financing, a lowering of tax rates
for both corporations and individuals, and the inversion of the individual and corporate income tax
rates.
0.5
During that same period, most of the major trading partners of the United States have
adopted some form of integration. In eliminating or reducing the double taxation of corporate
earnings, these countries have sought to reduce the cost of capital for domestic investment. By
adopting a comparable system, the United States would similarly seek to increase the incentives
for investment in the U.S. corporate sector.
0.6
The use of corporate debt financing increased dramatically during the 1980s. One reason
for this increase is the fact that under the current tax system, the deductibility of interest expense
by corporations encourages the use of debt financing instead of equity. The rise in the issuance
of debt has created greater risks of financial instability. Integration would decrease the tax
advantages of using debt over equity, thereby reducing the use of debt and fostering more stable
capital structures.
0.7
Another significant difference relates to the changes made to the tax rate structure for both
corporations and individuals. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986 TRA) substantially reduced the

1

tax rates for both corporations and individuals and, for the first time since 1913, the maximum
corporate tax rate is now higher than the maximum individual tax rate. In the past, the higher
individual rates encouraged corporations to retain rather than distribute their profits. Now, the
lower maximum individual tax rate has reduced (but not eliminated) the bias against corporate
distributions.
0.8
Several Federal governmental attempts to adopt some measure of integration have been
made since 1975. The concept of an integration system was proposed by both the Ford and
Carter administrations, but the idea was never formally included in a legislative bill. Subsequent
proposals were included in the 1984 study, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic
Growth: The Treasury Department Report to the President (popularly known as Treasury I), and
in the 1985 study, President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity
(Treasury II). These t w o reports were the genesis of the 1986 TRA.
0.9
Although the 1986 TRA did not include an integration provision, it directed the Treasury
Department to undertake a study of different approaches to achieving integration. This study, the
results of which were released in January 1992, 1 has focused further attention on corporate
integration.
0.10 Because of the renewed interest in integration and the existence of sound policy arguments
in favor of its adoption, the AICPA has decided to address the issue again.

DISCUSSION
0.11 Under the current classical system, the United States imposes t w o levels of tax on
corporate earnings. The corporation pays a first' tax on income when it is earned, and the
shareholders pay a second tax when the corporation distributes its earnings. It is generally agreed
that the double tax on corporate earnings results in a number of serious economic distortions and
raises several tax policy issues: (1) It reduces the incentive for equity investment in U.S.
corporations because of an increased cost of capital; (2) It favors debt financing over equity
financing by allowing a deduction for interest expense without permitting a similar deduction for
dividends; (3) It misallocates resources between corporate and noncorporate sectors because
investment decisions are likely to be made on the basis of the respective tax burdens; (4) It
negatively affects capital accumulation and the savings rate, with a resulting decline in economic
growth; (5) It encourages earnings retention at the corporate level to fund operations, resulting
in the potential misallocation of resources; (6) It lacks both horizontal and vertical equity because
of the inequality in the tax treatment between earnings from different types of investment and the
reduction in the progressivity of the tax system; and (7) It increases the use of tax-avoidance
methods to minimize the effect of the double tax, resulting in controversies between taxpayers
and the Internal Revenue Service.2

1

The Treasury Department January 1992, report, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems:
Taxing Business Income Only Once (hereinafter referred to as 1992 Treasury Report), recommends the
adoption of a dividend exclusion method. The report also recommends the long-range consideration of the
Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT), a more comprehensive integration prototype. Under CBIT,
shareholders and bondholders would exclude dividends and interest from income; however, neither type of
payment would be deductible by the corporation. For a more detailed description of CBIT, see appendix A.

2

For a more complete discussion of the economic distortions resulting from the current classical tax system,
see chapter 1.

2

0.12 Given the distortions and inequities inherent in the current tax system, the United States
seriously needs to explore the advisability of implementing an integrated tax system. Integration
would increase the after-tax amount available for investment and better balance the use of
equity-versus-debt financing. Integration would also make the tax system more equitable, and it
could be expected to promote increased efficiencies and growth in the U.S. economy.
0.13 The AICPA has analyzed six alternative methods of integrating the corporate and individual
tax systems. 3 Each method has been evaluated on the basis of whether it achieves the following
five basic objectives.
1.

Does the method lessen the relative tax advantages favoring investment in the
noncorporate sector?

2.

Does the method reduce the tax bias in favor of corporate debt financing?

3.

Does the method reduce the incentives to retain, rather than distribute, corporate
earnings?

4.

Does the method facilitate the interface with foreign tax systems?

5.

Does the method allow for ease of administration?

0.14 Each method was also reviewed to determine whether and how easily it could be designed
to address other issues such as the treatment of foreign investment, tax-exempt shareholders, and
corporate tax preferences. 4
0.15 This AICPA study primarily considers the three principal alternative methods of achieving
integration:
the flow-through method; the dividends-paid deduction method; and the
shareholder-credit method. The study also describes three variants of the principal methods: the
repeal of the corporate tax; the split-rate tax method; and the dividend-exclusion method.
0.16 The shareholder-credit method and the dividends-paid deduction method both provide
integration benefits only for distributed earnings. These methods can be structured to produce
substantially equivalent tax results. The principal difference between the t w o methods is that the
shareholder-credit method provides tax relief at the shareholder level, whereas the dividends-paid
deduction provides tax relief to the corporation.
0.17 The flow-through method is the purest form of integration. Under this method, a single
level of tax is imposed on corporate income at the shareholder level. Therefore, unlike the t w o
other methods, the flow-through method extends integration benefits to both distributed and
retained earnings.
0.18 Advocates for the adoption of the shareholder-credit method argue that it is preferable
because it achieves a higher level of compliance with less effort and because it is more flexible in
dealing with the key issues of the treatment of foreign and tax-exempt shareholders and the
pass-through of corporate tax preferences. Those who favor the dividends-paid deduction method
contend that it is simpler and easier to administer and that it more effectively deals with the tax
bias favoring debt over equity capital. Proponents of the flow-through method point out that it

3

For a more complete discussion of the alternative methods, see chapter 4.

4

For a more complete discussion of these issues, see chapter 2.
3

is the only method that achieves complete integration of both distributed and retained earnings.
However, it is the most difficult of the three methods to administer.
0.19 All major industrialized countries that have adopted an integration system have opted for
some form of the shareholder-credit method. 5 Therefore, if the shareholder-credit method is
adopted, the United States should benefit from prior international experience. Also, the adoption
of this method should simplify the interface between the U.S. system and the other integrated
foreign tax systems and facilitate treaty negotiations with these countries.

RECOMMENDATIONS
0.20 Integration should mitigate the economic distortions and inequities inherent in the present
classical system. To the extent that it lowers the cost of capital, it should increase domestic
corporate investment in the United States. To the extent that it reduces the tax bias toward debt
financing, it should help establish more stable capital structures. To the extent that it lessens the
incentives to retain earnings, it should foster more efficient decisions regarding the application of
corporate earnings.
0.21 In the interest of sound tax policy, the AICPA recommends that the United States adopt
a system of corporate integration. On the basis of its analysis of the alternatives available, the
AICPA believes that on balance the shareholder-credit method best achieves the five basic
objectives of integration described above. The AICPA further believes that it is the most flexible
method for dealing with the key issues of foreign investment, tax-exempt shareholders, and the
pass-through of corporate tax preferences. Moreover, administration of the shareholder-credit
method will be no more complicated (it may, in fact, be less complex) than the other alternative
methods. 6

5

For an analysis of the international experience with integration, see chapter 3.

6

The AICPA recognizes there are significant economic issues (including the effect on capital markets and the
federal deficit) and significant implementation issues (including the treatment of foreign and tax-exempt
investors) associated with the adoption of a shareholder-credit method. Although these issues are discussed
in chapters 1, 2, and 4, the AICPA takes no specific positions with respect to these issues in this statement
of tax policy.
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TAX POLICY ANALYSIS
Chapter 1
THE NEED FOR CORPORATE INTEGRATION

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1
The United States currently employs a classical system of double taxation on all corporate
earnings, first taxing earnings at the corporate level and then taxing shareholders when the
corporation distributes these earnings. An alternative approach used by other countries integrates
the corporate and shareholder tax systems, thereby eliminating or reducing one level of tax on
corporate earnings. Integration can be achieved either by eliminating the tax at the corporate level
or by eliminating the tax at the shareholder level.
1.2
The Tax Division of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) first
studied the issue of income tax integration in 1975 and published its findings and
recommendations as Statement of Tax Policy 3, Elimination of the Double Tax on Dividends
(Statement 3). At that time, the AICPA recommended the adoption of an integration system that
employed either the dividends-paid deduction method or the shareholder-credit method.
1.3
Following publication of the initial study in 1975, several governmental proposals
recommended the adoption of some form of integration. 7 The most notable were Tax Reform
for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report to the President
(Treasury I), and The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and
Simplicity (Treasury II). Both reports were the genesis of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986
TRA), although the Act did not include an integration provision. 8
1.4
An integration system was not enacted as part of the 1986 TRA presumably because of
the substantial loss of revenue that would result. 9 A basic goal of the 1986 TRA was revenue
neutrality; therefore, any provision that lost revenue had to be offset by a provision that raised
revenue. At a time when Congress was trying to raise federal revenues to offset the loss created
by the reduction of income tax rates, many proposals that lost substantial revenue, including corporate integration, were not seriously considered for inclusion in the final version of the 1986 TRA.

7

The Ford administration proposed an integration method to Congress in July 1975 and again in 1977, when
the Treasury Department issued Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform. Neither of these proposals passed and the
idea was dropped until 1978, when Chairman Al Ullman of the House Ways and Means Committee authored
an integration proposal (see 124 Congressional Record 2132 [1978] and 124 Congressional Record 7978
[1978]).

8

Treasury I and II contained provisions allowing domestic corporations— other than those subject to special tax
rates— a partial deduction for dividends paid to shareholders. However, the deduction would have been limited
to dividends paid out of fully taxable earnings. This provision permitted corporations to make distributions from
taxable income first. Also, restrictions would have been placed on deductions for distributions in redemption
of stock, including partial and complete liquidations. Treasury I would have allowed a deduction of 50 percent
of all eligible dividends; this percentage was reduced to 10 percent in Treasury II.

9

Most observers agree that the adoption of an integration system would produce a revenue loss. The magnitude
of the loss is debatable. The 1992 Treasury Report estimates that when fully phased in, integration would
reduce annual revenues by $13 billion to $50 billion or more, depending on the method adopted.

5

1.5
Some corporate managers have not favored a system of integration because of fears that
integration would increase the demand for dividend distributions. If shareholders demanded greater dividend payments, corporations would find it more difficult to retain earnings for financing new
investment. Therefore, corporations would be required to raise additional funds through borrowing
or issuing new equity.
1.6
Some segments of the business community have not embraced integration because its
benefits would vary substantially both among and within industries. 10 For example, industries
that distribute a larger proportion of their earnings as dividends may benefit more from integration
than those that retain a larger proportion of their earnings.11 Within an industry, studies have
suggested, small or rapidly growing firms may be at a competitive disadvantage because they need
proportionately greater capital than larger or more mature corporations.
1.7
Since the release of Statement of Tax Policy 3 in 1975, the economic situation and the tax
environment in the United States have changed significantly. Some of the major changes include
the lowering of tax rates for both corporations and individuals; the inversion of rates 12 between
the corporate and individual tax; the rise in the use of debt financing; the increase in federal deficits; the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine; 13 the increase in the percentage of equity
investment held by tax-exempt shareholders; and the growth of international trade
and competition. 14
1.8
The enactment of the 1986 TRA created circumstances more favorable to the adoption of
a system of integration. Some tax commentators 15 believe that the flattening of the corporate
and individual tax rates facilitates the adoption of integration. 16 These commentators argue that
highly progressive individual tax rates that exceed the corporate rate inhibit integration because
higher individual rates are not conducive to large dividend distributions.

10

Integration has not been widely accepted by the business community in the past. Recently, however, in a
letter to Kenneth Gideon, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, dated June 14, 1990, the National Association
of Manufacturers endorsed the idea of corporate integration.

11

Adoption of a flow-through method of integration would eliminate this problem because income would be
taxable to the shareholder when earned, whether distributed or not. However, unless a corporate tax were
paid, shareholders would pressure corporations to distribute cash at least equal to the resulting shareholder
tax.

12

Corporate and individual marginal tax rates were inverted by the 1986 TRA. Before 1987, the highest
individual tax rate was greater than the highest corporate tax rate. The highest corporate tax rate is currently
greater than the highest individual tax rate.

13

Under the General Utilities doctrine, a taxpayer was able to avoid the second level of taxation on certain
liquidating distributions and sales of appreciated corporate assets.

14

In a speech to the National Tax Association on November 1 2 , 1 9 9 0 , Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel Eric Zolt
included many of these factors as the reasons the Treasury also revisited the idea of corporate integration.

15

See, for example, Ernest S. Christian, Jr., "Integrating Corporate and Shareholder Taxes," Tax Notes
(September 17, 1990), 1519-1526.

16

Other commentators disagree with this opinion and believe that the 1986 TRA actually moved toward disintegration instead of toward the adoption of an integration method. They believe that the change in the tax law
strengthened the double tax on corporate earnings because (1) the maximum tax rate decreased more for individuals than for corporations, (2) capital gains became fully taxable, (3) passive loss rules for individuals were
introduced, (4) the General Utilities doctrine was repealed, and (5) the dividends-paid deduction was reduced
from 85 percent to 80 percent. See Larry L. Dildine, "Effects on Industry," in Tax Reform and the United
States Economy, ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 9 3 1 - 9 4 2 .
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1.9
Another change that favors the adoption of integration concerns the elimination of a highly
preferential capital gains tax rate. As a result of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, the
highest individual tax rate is 31 percent, whereas the maximum capital gains rate is 28 percent
(corporations pay a maximum of 34 percent on both types of income). Therefore, corporations
are less likely to be pressured by their shareholders to retain earnings in order to enable
shareholders to convert ordinary income (dividends) into capital gains (gains from the sale or
exchange of the corporation's stock).
1.10 Corporate income subject to double taxation was increased after 1986 by the repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine, which generally had enabled liquidating distributions and sales to escape
taxation at the corporate level. Before 1987, liquidating dispositions of appreciated property were
only taxed once, while ordinary dividends carried the burden of a double tax. This unequal
treatment encouraged the corporation to retain earnings and invest them in appreciating assets
before distributing or selling them in the course of liquidation. As a result, shareholders received
more after-tax benefits from the corporation. However, since the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine, corporations must pay tax on the appreciation in the value of assets when distributed
in liquidation. This change enhances the case for integration, because now all corporate earnings,
if distributed, are taxed twice.
1.11 The globalization of trade and the effects of foreign competition on the U.S. economy together provide a major impetus for integration. When the AICPA first studied this issue, few countries had implemented an integrated tax system. Today, most major industrialized nations have
adopted some form of integration. These systems favor domestic over foreign investment, and
they provide tax advantages to resident shareholders that are not available to foreign shareholders.
Moreover, without an integration system, the United States does not have as strong a bargaining
position in treaty negotiations with countries that have adopted such a system. 17 It is very difficult to convince foreign countries to extend integration benefits to U.S. shareholders when the
United States cannot offer similar benefits to foreign-country residents who invest in U.S.
corporations.
1.12 In addition, the double tax on corporate earnings increases the cost of capital, 18 making
investment by foreign taxpayers in the United States less attractive than investment in countries
that have a lower cost of capital. Therefore, the adoption of an integration system can be
expected to improve the competitive position of the United States in global financial markets and
increase foreign investment in the United States. 19
17

The United States has been unsuccessful in negotiating any integration benefits for U.S. shareholders under
its tax treaties with Germany and Italy. These countries implemented integration systems in 1977, and new
tax treaties went into effect in 1991 and 1985. In contrast, in its tax treaties with the United Kingdom and
France, the United States has obtained some integration benefits for U.S. shareholders. See appendix B for
further information. Also, see Richard L. Doernberg, "International Aspects of Individual and Corporate Tax
Integration," Tax Notes International (March 16, 1992), 5 3 5 - 5 4 4 .

18

Interest rates, the inflation rate, economic depreciation, and taxes levied on income from the investment are
all factors affecting the cost of capital for a specific venture. Lower capital costs stimulate economic growth
and savings. Several recent studies show that the cost of capital in the United States is higher than that of
several of its trading partners, thus making it difficult to be competitive. See Charls E. Walker and Mark A.
Bloomfield, "The Case for the Restoration of a Capital Gains Tax Differential," Tax Notes (May 22, 1989),
1019-1029, and Dan Cordiz and James Srodes, "A Memo to Congress," Financial World (December 26,
1989), 2 2 - 2 7 .

19

There appears to be no empirical evidence to support the conclusion that adoption of an integration system
would in fact improve the United States' competitive position. Nor can the experiences of other countries in
adopting such a system be relied upon, because their economies have continued to be affected by many other
business and social factors. However, the economic model used in the 1992 Treasury Report indicates that

7

1.13
The deductibility of interest expense under the current tax system encourages the use of
debt financing over equity. 20 This tax bias has resulted in the increased use of borrowing, which
has both eroded the corporate tax base and heightened the risks associated with financial
instability. 21 Many bankruptcy-prediction studies have found that a high debt-to-equity ratio
contributes significantly to corporate failure. 22 Since many forms of integration would reduce
the relative tax advantages of debt financing, the use of debt should decrease, expanding the
corporate tax base and fostering more stable capital structures.

A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
1.14
Three rationales for the current double-tax system have been offered: first, that the
corporation and its owners have separate utility functions that can be exercised independently; 23
second, that the corporation is a more efficient producer that creates surplus profits that should
be taxed; 24 and third, that a corporate tax is needed to safeguard the individual income tax. 25
1.15
The first rationale justifies the imposition of a two-tier tax on the grounds that the
corporation and all of its owners have an independent ability to exercise power over their incomes.
This argument, called the power rationale, relies for its support on horizontal equity principles 26
and the definition of a taxable unit. According to this rationale, the corporation and its owners are

integration will have a positive, although possibly a limited, effect on foreign investment in the United States
and on U.S. investment abroad.
20

On a number of occasions in recent years, Congress has attempted to reduce the erosion of the corporate tax
base by limiting the deduction of interest expense. (There are other provisions, not relevant here, that have
also put significant restrictions on interest deductions by individual taxpayers.) Taken as a whole, these
attempts appear to be a piecemeal approach to neutralizing debt-versus-equity differences.
The enactment of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 864(e) by the 1986 TRA significantly limited interest
deductions. This section requires U.S. taxpayers to allocate and apportion interest expense when determining
foreign-source taxable income. The effect is to reduce the current benefit of foreign tax credits, thus
increasing the double taxation of corporate earnings by U.S. and foreign jurisdictions and reducing the
competitiveness of U.S. companies in the global economy.
In 1989, several additional amendments to the IRC were made that deferred or denied the tax benefit of
interest expense. These amendments include IRC Sections 163(e)(5), 163(i), and 163(j), which relates to the
deferral or denial of interest on certain high-yield original-issue discount debt obligations and certain interest
paid by corporations to related parties.
Other sections that reduce the amount of interest allowed include IRC Section 279 (corporate interest expense
incurred to acquire stock or assets in certain circumstances), IRC Section 246A (interest expense incurred to
finance portfolio stock), and IRC Section 265(a)(2) (interest expense incurred to purchase tax-exempt
obligations).

21

See Willard Taylor and Bernard Aidinoff, "Approaches to Debt:
(December 1989), 9 3 1 - 9 4 2 .

22

See Geraldine Gerardi et al., "Corporate Integration Puzzles," National Tax Journal 43 (September 1990),
307-314.

23

See Rebecca S. Rudnick, "Corporate Tax Integration: Liquidity of Investment," Tax Notes (February 27, 1989),
1107-1123.

24

Ibid.

25

See Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).

26

Is Integration the Answer?" Taxes

A system is horizontally equitable if taxpayers with equal incomes pay an equal amount of tax.
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considered separate economic units, each of which has the power to exercise savings and
consumption decisions over its own income. Since all parties have the power to make such
decisions, each should be taxed.
1.16 The second rationale assumes that the corporate structure produces efficiencies resulting
in surplus profits that should be taxed. This assumption is based on the theory that a
corporation's management, economic size, and access to capital markets enable it to produce
profits in excess of profits available to individual shareholders. Two levels of tax should result
because corporations can generate larger amounts of income.
1.17 The possibility that all levels of taxation on corporate income may be avoided provides the
third rationale. If corporations are not separately taxed, individual shareholders can avoid the
individual income tax by accumulating income at the corporate level. Imposition of a separate tax
on corporations may provide the best way to ensure that all income will be taxed at least once.
1.18 Although the classical system can be defended, the double taxation of corporate income
produces a number of serious economic distortions and raises several tax policy questions. A
discussion of some of the major problems caused by the double taxation under the present system
follows.
Missed Opportunities

for the United States

1.19 Currently, the failure of the United States to adopt tax integration discourages foreign
investment in domestic corporations because the double taxation of corporate earnings decreases
the return on corporate investment. In recent years, the cost of capital in the United States has
been among the highest in the industrialized world, 27 making investment in the United States
relatively less attractive than investment in countries that have a lower cost of capital.
1.20 Additionally, most countries with an integrated system encourage residents to invest within
the country by granting integration benefits only to investments in domestic corporations. In
limiting benefits to domestic earnings and to resident shareholders, an integration system may be
viewed as protectionist. Foreign investment in domestic corporations can be encouraged when
the benefits of integration are extended to foreign shareholders.28
1.21 The United States, the only major industrialized nation that has not adopted integration,
may be at a disadvantage in world markets because of its higher cost of capital. By adopting an
integration system, the United States will increase the after-tax return on corporate capital and,
therefore, will be more competitive in attracting foreign investment.
1.22 Without integration, the United States is also at a disadvantage in treaty negotiations, since
this country cannot offer the same benefits to foreign investors that other countries can extend
to U.S. residents. Because the United States does not provide comparable credit for dividends,
foreign countries are not as willing to extend their integration benefits to U.S. investors.

27

See Walker and Bloomfield, "The Case for the Restoration of a Capital Gains Tax Differential," 1019-1029.

28

See Steven C. Wrappe, "The Protectionist Potential of the Imputation Form of Corporate Integration," Tax
Notes (May 7, 1990), 727-731. See also Hugh J. Ault, "Corporate Integration and Tax Treaties: Where Do
We Go From Here?" Tax Notes International (March 16, 1992), 545-548.
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Debt Versus Equity
1.23 The current system allows a corporation a deduction for interest while not permitting a
deduction for the payment of dividends. This difference in tax treatment between debt and equity
can produce a distortion in a corporation's capitalization, investment, and distribution policies. The
reduced after-tax cost of debt financing encourages corporations to finance their operations
through the use of debt. This increased use of debt requires corporations to meet higher fixed
charges for interest and principal. Therefore, such higher debt-to-equity ratios increase the
possibility of financial distress.
Misallocation Between Corporate and Noncorporate Sectors
1.24 A system that levies a double tax on only one source of income creates an economic
distortion because investment decisions may be altered on the basis of the tax burden. 29 Some
economists suggest that the amount of tax liability should be no more than a small determinant
in the decision to invest in certain types of economic activity. 30 Taxing corporate earnings twice
lowers the after-tax return to investors. Therefore, the cost of capital in the corporate sector is
greater than in the noncorporate sector. 31
1.25 As investors seek to maximize after-tax return on capital, they may shift their investments
from the corporate sector to the noncorporate sector. This shift may result in a lower return from
any given amount of capital, thereby decreasing overall economic output. In addition, the current
system discourages capital-intensive investment, since such activities must be conducted in
corporate form because of the large financing requirements. Because of the high cost of capital,
investors may be inclined to reallocate their funds from capital-intensive industries to industries
such as domestic trade and service. 32 These investment decisions create a less than optimal
situation because capital is not being utilized to its highest potential.
Negative Effect on Capital Accumulation
1.26 Economists stress the importance of capital accumulation in a country's economic growth.
The double tax on corporate earnings negatively affects capital accumulation and economic growth
by limiting the savings rate. 33 The average growth and savings rates in the United States are

29

See Gerardi et al., "Corporate Integration Puzzles," 308. Also see Ernest S. Christian, Jr., "Integrating the
Corporate Tax: Methods, Motivations and Effects," in Tax Policy Study for AEI (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1977).

30

Economic investment decisions should be evaluated on the basis of their merit, not on the basis of the tax
advantages the investment will produce. When investments are driven primarily by tax consequences,
resources are not used efficiently. See Eugene Steurle, "Effects on Financial Decisionmaking," in Tax Reform
and the United States Economy," ed. Joseph A. Pechman (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1987), 5 5 - 7 0 .

31

Investors consider all costs of a particular venture when making investment decisions. The combination of all
financial and tax costs determines the overall cost of capital.

32

33

The 1986 TRA increased corporate tax burdens more than it increased the tax burdens on noncorporate
businesses. This increase adds to the bias against the use of corporations. However, on average, domestic
trade and service businesses will have a direct tax reduction because these industries generally receive more
benefits from the rate reduction than the broadened tax-base costs. Therefore, many investors may shift to
these sectors. See Dildine, "Effects on Industry," in Tax Reform and the United States Economy, 9 4 1 - 9 4 2 .
See Jane G. Gravelle, "Corporate Tax Integration:
(June 14, 1991), 1-57.
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Issues and Opinions," CRS Report for Congress

lower than in most other industrialized nations. 34 This difference may be partly attributable to
the present tax system since the double tax increases the tax burden on corporate income and
thus reduces the rate of return on investment in the corporate sector. Studies have shown that
lower rates of return inhibit savings and investment. 35 Therefore, investors ignore many new and
innovative ventures because the risks involved exceed the expected return. This misallocation of
resources distorts investment decisions and limits economic growth.
Earnings Retention at the Corporate Level
1.27 Under the present classical system, corporations are encouraged to retain earnings and
thereby avoid a second level of tax until distributions are made. Therefore, corporations have an
incentive to fund operations with retained earnings rather than to issue additional equity. The
retention of earnings precludes shareholders from making independent investment decisions about
these earnings, which may result in a misallocation of resources.
1.28 The 1986 TRA reduced the advantages of corporate earnings retention by repealing the
General Utilities doctrine. 36 Nevertheless, since the double tax on liquidation is still deferred until
a future date, corporations and their shareholders may continue to favor retention of assets over
current distributions because of the time value of money.
Lack of Horizontal Equity
1.29 Horizontal equity exists when taxpayers with equal incomes pay an equal amount of tax.
The 1986 TRA reduced the horizontal inequity of the then-current system. 37 However, some
inequity remains because the double tax on corporate earnings causes shareholders to effectively
pay more tax than do investors in the noncorporate sector. This double tax also creates an
inequality in the tax treatment between earnings from equity investments and other sources of
income such as interest and wages.
Lack of Vertical Equity
1.30 Vertical equity compares the ability of each taxpayer to pay taxes with the actual tax
liability of that taxpayer. This principle is satisfied when taxpayers with greater financial resources

34

See Walker and Bloomfield, "The Case for the Restoration of the Capital Gains Tax Differential," 1019-1029.

35

See Gerardi et al., "Corporate Integration Puzzles," 309. See studies that suggest that aggregate investment
is quite sensitive to tax changes, by Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson, "Tax Policy and Investment
Behavior," American Economic Review 57 (June 1967), 391 - 4 1 4 , and Martin S. Feldstein and Joonsung Jun,
"The Effects of Tax Rules on Nonresidential Fixed Investment: Some Preliminary Evidence from the 1980's,"
in The Effects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation, ed. M. Feldstein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1987).

36

The erosion of the General Utilities doctrine occurred through a series of legislative changes spanning many
years. IRC Section 311(d), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, required corporate-level gain recognition
on distributions of appreciated property in redemption of stock. Exceptions to this rule included, among others,
distributions in complete termination of certain 10-percent-or-greater shareholders and distribution of stock or
obligations to pay death taxes under IRC Section 303. Beginning in 1982, most distributions in partial
liquidation resulted in gain recognition. The 1984 Tax Reform Act repealed the corporate nonrecognition rule
with respect to nonliquidating distributions of appreciated property. The 1986 TRA completely repealed the
General Utilities doctrine by requiring corporations to recognize gain or loss on sales or distributions made
pursuant to a complete liquidation.

37

By eliminating may loopholes and tax advantages and broadening the tax base, more types of income are taxed
equally, helping to produce horizontal equity.
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pay a larger portion of the aggregate tax burden. Therefore, a progressive tax system produces
a greater level of vertical equity. Under the current system, however, the effective tax rate on
corporate earnings for a shareholder in the lower tax brackets increases more rapidly than the rate
for a shareholder in the higher brackets. This effect reduces the progressivity of the tax system,
directly conflicting with the objectives of vertical equity. 38
Tax Avoidance
1.31 Corporate earnings are the only source of income that bears the burden of double taxation.
To avoid this inequity, corporations have devised various ways to pass these earnings out of the
corporation in a form other than dividends. Although the current system contains several
provisions to prevent corporations from circumventing the double tax, the enforcement of these
provisions is both costly and administratively burdensome.

THE OBJECTIVES OF INTEGRATION
1.32 A system of integration would lower the cost of capital and mitigate many of the
distortions and inequities created by the present classical system by taxing corporate income only
once. There are several methods or approaches available to relieve the double taxation of
corporate profits.
1.33 In evaluating the alternative methods available, the AICPA has identified five basic
objectives that an integrated system should seek to achieve:

38

•

A more uniform taxation of income earned in the corporate and noncorporate sectors

•

A reduction in the tax bias favoring debt financing

•

A reduction of tax incentives for corporations to retain rather than distribute their
profits

•

An easy interface with foreign integrated tax systems

•

No significant additional complexity for the tax system

This result produced by the current system is best illustrated by comparing the effective tax rate imposed on
distributed earnings received by a shareholder in the 15-percent tax bracket with that imposed on a shareholder
in the 31-percent-tax bracket in both a double-level tax system and an integrated tax system.
Assuming a 34 percent corporate tax rate, a corporation with $1,000 taxable income pays $340 in income
tax. If the remaining $660 is paid to the shareholder as a dividend, the 15 percent shareholder pays income
taxes on this amount of $99. This results in an effective tax rate of 43.9 percent (corporate tax of $340 plus
individual tax of $99 divided by pre-tax corporate income of $1,000). In comparison, the 31 percent tax
bracket shareholder pays income taxes of $205 on the dividend income. The effective tax rate for this
shareholder is 54.5 percent ($340 in corporate tax plus $205 in individual tax divided by $1,000 corporate
taxable income).
To summarize, the higher tax bracket shareholder's effective tax rate on distributed earnings is only 24.1
percent higher than the comparable rate for the lower tax bracket shareholder under current law ( [54.5
percent/43.9 percent]-1). In contrast, under an integrated tax system using the shareholder's tax rate, the
higher tax bracket shareholder's effective tax rate is 106.7 percent higher than the lower tax bracket shareholder's effective tax rate ([31 percent/15 percent]-1) with respect to distributed earnings.
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BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS
1.34 This study analyzes the three principal alternative methods of implementing an integration
system: (1) the flow-through method; (2) the dividends-paid deduction method; and (3) the
shareholder-credit method. However, three variants of these principal methods have also been
considered: (1) the repeal of the corporate tax; (2) the split-rate corporate-level tax; and (3) the
dividend-exclusion method. 39
1.35 A brief overview of the three principal alternatives follows. A more detailed evaluation of
these methods, as well as a discussion of the three variants, will follow later in this study.
Flow-Through Method
1.36 The flow-through integration method achieves complete integration of all corporate earnings
by allocating all items of income to shareholders in a manner similar to the allocation of partnership
and S corporation income under the current system. This method taxes all income at the
shareholder level when earned, whether or not distributed. The flow-through method represents
the purest form of integration because it subjects all corporate income to only one level of tax, at
the shareholder rates.
Dividends-Paid Deduction Method
1.37 The dividends-paid deduction method allows a corporation to deduct all or part of dividends
paid from taxable income. Under this method, the benefits of integration inure to the corporation,
since shareholders still report dividends received as income. To the extent that corporations make
fully deductible distributions, one level of tax at the shareholder's tax rate should result. This
method does not extend integration benefits to retained earnings.
Shareholder-Credit Method
1.38 The shareholder-credit method imposes a corporate-level tax on all earnings, but grants a
credit to shareholders for a portion of the corporate tax paid that is allocated or imputed to
dividends. This method generally requires shareholders to "gross up" their dividend income by the
amount of credit allowed. Integration is achieved by eliminating or reducing the tax on dividends
at the shareholder level. Therefore, the benefits of integration inure to the shareholder. As with
the dividends-paid deduction method, double-tax relief applies only to distributed income.
Therefore, integration benefits are not granted to retained income.

39

The 1992 Treasury Report extensively analyzes four integration prototypes: the dividend-exclusion method,
the flow-through method, the shareholder-credit method, and the CBIT. The report does not consider the

repeal of the corporate tax or the split-rate method, and it provides only a brief evaluation of the dividends-paid
deduction method.
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Chapter 2
KEY ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED

2.1
Several issues must be addressed regardless of the method of integration adopted,
including the treatment of outbound and inbound foreign investment, tax-exempt shareholders, and
corporate tax preferences, as well as the problems that will probably be encountered in the transition to an integrated system. This section examines these and other crucial issues that will need
to be considered in designing an integrated system.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS
2.2
A principle of taxation is that a system should be neutral toward domestic and foreign
investment. Outbound neutrality, sometimes called capital-export neutrality, exists if domestic and
foreign investment by resident shareholders are taxed equally. The present classical system seeks
to achieve capital-export neutrality by allowing U.S. taxpayers a credit against their U.S. taxes for
foreign tax paid on foreign-source income.
2.3
Most countries that have adopted an integration system treat foreign taxes less favorably
than domestic taxes, creating a bias against foreign investment. Additionally, some of these
countries create another bias against foreign investment by domestic corporations by levying a
compensatory tax 40 on distributions from foreign-source income that are not subject to domestic
taxation (even though a tax has already been paid on this income in the foreign country). By not
allowing foreign tax credits to offset the compensatory tax, this treatment results in a double tax
on foreign-source income while subjecting domestic-source income to only one level of taxation.
However, to mitigate this result, these countries generally consider fully taxed domestic-source
income to be distributed first, thereby imposing a compensatory tax only on distributions in excess
of fully taxed domestic-source income. In an integrated system, capital-export neutrality could be
achieved by passing the benefit of foreign tax credits through to the shareholders. The
methodology for achieving this result would vary depending on the integration method adopted. 41
FOREIGN SHAREHOLDERS
2.4
Inbound or capital-import neutrality exists if domestic investments by both resident and
nonresident shareholders receive equal treatment. When dividends paid to foreign shareholders
receive the same integration benefits as distributions made to domestic shareholders,

40

A system of integration can levy a compensatory tax on distributions made out of nontaxable income. This
tax increases a corporation's tax burden and reduces the benefits of integration. By levying such a tax on
foreign-source income or on income that is tax-exempt because of corporate tax preferences, the system
guarantees that at least one level of tax is paid on all income.

41

If foreign and domestic taxes do not receive equal treatment, and if distributions come out of domestic income
first, a corporation with $100 taxable income would pay a total tax of $34 (assuming a U.S. tax rate of 34
percent). Suppose the $34 tax is composed of $10 in foreign tax and $24 in domestic tax. The $24 domestic
tax results from the $34 statutory amount less a foreign tax credit of $10 for the taxes paid to the foreign
government. In this situation, a compensatory tax would be paid if distributions exceeded $46.60, the amount
of after-tax domestic taxable income that would create a tax of $24 computed at a 34 percent rate ($24/.34

= $70.60; $70.60 - $24 = $46.60). If foreign and domestic taxes receive equal treatment, a compensatory
tax only would result if distributions exceeded $66, the total after-tax amount of taxable income ($100 - $34).
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capital-import neutrality results and the inequality between foreign and domestic shareholders is
eliminated.
2.5
Under the current classical system, the United States seeks to achieve some level of
capital-import neutrality by imposing withholding taxes on dividends paid to foreign shareholders.
For foreign corporations that conduct business in the United States through a U.S. branch, the
double taxation of their U.S. profits is achieved through the imposition of the branch profits tax
enacted by the 1986 TRA.42
2.6
The goal of achieving capital-import neutrality must be weighed against the costs of
extending integration benefits to foreign shareholders. Many foreign shareholders pay little or no
tax in the United States on dividends from domestic corporations. 43 Therefore, extension of
integration benefits to foreign shareholders would allow a portion of corporate earnings either to
escape taxation in the United States or to be taxed at a very low rate. 44 Presumably, because
the costs (that is, lost revenue) resulting from taxing earnings paid to foreign shareholders at low
rates outweigh the benefits of neutrality, countries that have adopted integration generally have
not extended integration benefits to foreign shareholders except by special reciprocal agreements
in their treaties.
2.7
Capital-import neutrality would be achieved in an integrated system by taxing foreign
shareholders in the same manner as domestic shareholders. Under some methods of integration,
this result would require U.S. withholding on corporate distributions. The level of withholding and
the level of integration benefits granted to foreign shareholders would be the subject of treaty
negotiations, enhancing the position of the United States in obtaining integration benefits for U.S.
shareholders in other countries. 46

TAX-EXEMPT SHAREHOLDERS
2.8
The mix of shareholders has changed over the past fifteen years to the point that pension
plans and other tax-exempt organizations hold a large percentage of corporate stock. 46
Currently, corporate dividends and interest received by tax-exempt organizations are not subject
to income tax; however, an exempt organization's share of income from publicly traded partnerships that are not treated as corporations is taxed as unrelated trade or business income. If
integration benefits are extended to tax-exempt shareholders, it could result in corporate income's
escaping all levels of income tax; whether this is a desirable result is a tax policy question beyond
the scope of this study.
2.9
The extension of corporate integration benefits to tax-exempt shareholders is a major tax
policy issue with significant revenue implications that must be addressed. At the present time,

42

IRC Section 884.

43

Most income earned by foreign residents escapes taxation in the United States because of provisions included
in tax treaties.

44

This situation would not arise if an exclusion were available at the shareholder level.

45

See Michael J. Graetz, Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means on the President's 1978
Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, 6144-6166.

46

An individual taxpayer pays a tax on corporate earnings distributed to pension plans when the taxpayer
receives pension payments. Therefore, special provisions that distinguish pension plans from other tax-exempt
shareholders may need to be included in an integration system.
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equity investments dominate the investment portfolios of most tax-exempt organizations. 47 It
is unclear whether the denial of integration benefits to tax-exempt shareholders would cause these
organizations to shift their investments from equity to debt; also, it is not clear whether this result
is desirable. 48 One possible solution to this problem is to tax interest income as unrelated trade
or business income; 49 this should significantly reduce the portfolio shifting many IRC Section
501(c) organizations and pension plans might otherwise undertake. 50 An alternative approach
is to make the tax credit or the withheld amount with respect to dividends refundable to
tax-exempt organizations. Corporate income from both debt and equity would be tax-exempt, thus
eliminating the need to shift portfolio investments.

TAX PREFERENCES
2.10 Corporate tax preferences reduce the amount of corporate income subject to tax through
the allowance of special exclusions, deductions, credits, and other provisions not recognized for
financial accounting purposes. Corporate preferences allow corporations to distribute income to
shareholders that has not been taxed at the full corporate tax rate. In designing an integration
system, it must be determined whether tax preferences should be passed through to the
shareholder or retained at the corporate level. Proponents of passing through tax preferences to
shareholders advance t w o arguments: first, that distributed items of tax preference should be
treated as if earned by the individual, not the corporation; and second, that a reduction of
corporate tax on earnings devalues tax preferences. Supporters of the first argument believe that
tax preferences should be passed through to maintain the incentives for which the tax preferences
were originally enacted.
2.11 Opponents counter that the tax treatment of corporations and individuals is not intended
to be equal, as current law purposely distinguishes between corporations and individuals in many
areas, especially tax-incentive provisions. These opponents also argue that passing corporate
preferences through to individuals would create new inefficiencies and inequities in the tax system,
since granting special deductions or exclusions produces a greater tax benefit to shareholders in
higher tax brackets than to shareholders in lower brackets. 51 In addition, if integration seeks only
to eliminate the corporate-level tax on distributions, then preferences should not be passed through
to shareholders.52 The current system specifically curtails the ability of corporations to distribute

47

See 1992 Treasury Report, Table 6 . 1 .

48

Denial of integration benefits to tax-exempt shareholders may cause a portfolio shift because equity investment
becomes less valuable in relation to debt investments. This situation could arise if the rate of return on equity
investment decreases below that of debt. One response to integration could be a decrease in actual dividend
payments by corporations, since shareholders would require a smaller amount of dividends to have the same
after-tax cash flow as under current law. (This idea contradicts the popular notion discussed earlier that
integration would increase dividend payments.) If corporations do decrease dividend payments, tax-exempt
organizations are more likely to shift their portfolios from equity to debt.

49

IRC Section 512(c)(2).

50

IRC Section 501 (c) organizations include most charitable, educational, and not-for-profit service organizations.

51

See The Treatment of Nonbusiness Expenditures:
(Washington, D.C.: AICPA, 1990).

52

See Alvin C. Warren, "The Relations and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes," Harvard Law

The Form of the Tax Allowance - Deduction or Credit

Review 94, no. 719 (1981), 7 7 7 - 7 7 8 .
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untaxed income to shareholders tax-free. 53 Passing through tax preferences to shareholders
under integration would reverse the effect of these provisions.
2.12 The second argument in favor of passing through tax preferences to shareholders relies on
the fact that any reduction in the corporate tax also reduces the benefits of tax preferences. Since
integration reduces the tax on corporate earnings, the benefit corporations can receive from tax
preferences is also reduced. Proponents of this view argue that the benefit of these preferences
should be passed through to the shareholders to compensate for the value lost by reducing the
corporate tax. Supporters also contend that by not passing corporate tax preferences through to
shareholders, the system would eliminate the tax incentives that preferences are meant to provide.
However, opponents of this view argue that since integration accomplishes the same goal that
corporate tax preferences were originally meant to achieve (i.e., the lowering of total corporate
tax), the additional benefits created by passing through tax preferences become unnecessary.
2.13 When corporate tax preferences are not passed through to shareholders, most other
countries that have adopted an integrated system levy a compensatory tax. This tax applies to
distributions of preference items that otherwise would have been tax-free.
2.14 The ordering of distributions must be addressed whether preferences are passed through
to shareholders or whether a compensatory tax is levied on distributed preferences. Possible
choices include stacking preferences last, stacking preferences first, or prorating distributions
between taxable and nontaxable income. Most foreign integrated systems currently stack
preferences last, which means they treat all distributions as coming from fully taxed income first.
This method seems to be the easiest to administer.
2.15 A related issue is the effect integration would have on the alternative minimum tax. Since
the current alternative minimum tax relies largely on restoring preferences to the tax base,
policymakers would need to reevaluate the role of the alternative minimum tax in an integrated
system. The issues that would need to be addressed and the actual changes required will likely
be quite extensive and are beyond the scope of this study.

RETAINED EARNINGS
2.16 The adoption of an integrated system raises the issue of whether both distributed income
and retained earnings should receive the benefits of integration. If both receive full integration
benefits, no distortion of either vertical or horizontal equity should occur. This type of system
should eliminate tax-induced investment decisions and achieve neutrality concerning the choice
of business entity. 54
2.17 Under our current system, a shareholder who sells or exchanges stock recognizes a gain
or loss measured by the difference between the amount realized in the transaction and the
adjusted basis of the stock. 55 If the amount realized exceeds the basis, a gain is recognized.
This gain reflects both the retained earnings of the corporation and the net unrealized appreciation

53

The earnings-and-profits rules under IRC Section 312 prohibit earnings that are not taxed at the corporate level
from being passed to shareholders tax-free.

54

See appendix B for a comparison of the effect of corporate distribution levels on effective tax rates under
current law and alternative tax integration methods.

55

IRC Section 1001(1).
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in the value of the corporation's assets. Recognition of this gain at the shareholder level results
in the double taxation of a corporation's retained earnings.
2.18 The reduction or elimination of capital gains taxes on corporate investments would mitigate
the second tax on undistributed earnings.56 Another approach would adjust shareholder stock
basis by the amount of retained earnings allocated to the stock, in a manner similar to the
flow-through method. 57

NONDIVIDEND DISTRIBUTIONS
2.19 Another issue is whether distributions other than those from current earnings should be
eligible for integration benefits. Under our current system, ordinary distributions are treated first
as being from current and accumulated earnings, then as a recovery of capital, and finally as a gain
on the exchange of the stock. 58 Furthermore, the current system treats liquidating distributions
and certain redemption transactions as the equivalent of stock sales regardless of the amount of
current and accumulated corporate earnings.59
2.20 Without equal treatment of all distributions, corporations would need to specify the type
of distribution made, and this would require more complex recordkeeping. If integration benefits
were limited to distributions of current and accumulated earnings, the reverse of current tax
planning strategies would apply. For example, if regular dividends received the benefits of
integration and liquidating distributions did not, some corporations might postpone liquidating until
all earnings and profits were distributed, a move that could result in an inefficient use of capital.
On the other hand, if distributions in redemption or liquidation received integration benefits, a bias
against sales of stock in the open market might occur, causing many shareholders to hold on to
stock that they would rather sell, again resulting in an inefficient use of capital.
2.21 Capital losses in an integrated system need to be considered. For example, if a shareholder
strips substantial assets from a corporation, the value of his or her stock may be reduced below
the basis of the stock. If dividends are received tax-free under an integrated system, the
subsequent sale of the stock will produce an artificial tax loss.
2.22 The dividend stripping strategy is addressed under our current system in several ways,
including a provision that requires a shareholder receiving an extraordinary dividend to reduce his
or her basis in the underlying stock by the untaxed portion of a dividend. 60 Similarly, an
integrated system could require a basis reduction for shareholders who receive certain distributions
subject to integration benefits. Another approach would simply disallow any deduction for certain

56

Many of the countries that have integrated their corporate and individual income tax systems provide some
preferential treatment for capital gains on stock sales through either basis indexing or reduced effective tax
rates.

57

None of the countries that have adopted the shareholder credit method allow for such an allocation. However,
the Treasury Department's Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform and the Carter Commission in Canada in 1966
recommended that such an allocation be included in a shareholder credit method of integration. See U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977) and Report of the Royal Commission on
Taxation (1966).

58

IRC Section 301 (c).

59

IRC Sections 302(a) and 3 3 1 .

60

IRC Section 1059.
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capital losses, an alternative implemented under our current system in the consolidated return
regulations. 61

THE LEVEL OF INTEGRATION
2.23 If integration benefits were provided only for distributed income, full integration would allow
either a credit for all corporate tax paid on distributed income or a full deduction for all dividends
paid. Partial integration allows either a percentage of tax to be creditable or a deduction for only
part of the dividends paid. Other countries that have adopted integration differ in their treatment
of this problem, with some allowing full credit while others allow only partial benefit. Adopting
partial integration benefits could substantially decrease the loss of revenue, but obviously, it would
not fully accomplish the goals of integration.
INTERCORPORATE DIVIDENDS
2.24 Dividends paid to corporate shareholders also require examination, since most of the rules
related to integration consider shareholders to be individual taxpayers. However, a large
percentage of shareholders includes other corporations, many of which belong to affiliated groups
that file consolidated tax returns. If, under an integrated system, the corporate tax is incidental
to the individual income tax, dividends paid to corporate shareholders should receive the same
benefits as dividends paid to individual shareholders.
2.25 To tax intercorporate dividend income properly in an integrated system, the
dividends-received deduction allowed to corporations under the current tax system would need to
be modified. For example, corporate income would not be taxed if the payer corporation were
allowed a deduction for dividends paid, and if the recipient corporation were allowed a second
deduction for the dividends received. Alternatively, allowing the recipient corporation both a
deduction and a tax credit for the dividends received would also produce a double-tax benefit.
2.26 These problems should arise only with intercorporate dividends paid outside a consolidated
group, since intercorporate dividends within a consolidated group are eliminated. In this regard,
integration concepts should be applied at the consolidated level, with the consolidated group
treated as a single taxpayer.

IMPACT ON STATE TAXATION
2.27 In many states, the computation of a taxpayer's state taxable income begins with the
taxpayer's federal taxable income. Therefore, if an integration method alters the computation of
federal taxable income, adjustments to the federal amount may be required to prevent erosion of
the state income tax base. Depending on the integration method adopted at the federal level, such
adjustments could add significant complexities to state income tax systems.
2.28 The adoption of integration at the state level could result in the shifting of tax bases
between the states. Such a shift would arise if corporate income were taxed in the shareholder's
state of residence, instead of in the state where the corporation conducts business. A change
from taxing income at its origin to taxing it at its destination could substantially alter the tax

61

Treasury Regulations, Section 1.1502-20.
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revenues for a particular state. In addition, state integration could result in the loss of a state's
ability to independently tax corporate income generated within its borders. 62

FINANCIAL STATEMENT IMPACT
2.29 Integration may have a significant effect on corporate financial earnings, depending on the
type of method adopted. There should be no effect on the paying corporation's financial
statements if the shareholder-credit method is adopted, because it would not change the tax paid
at the corporate level. In addition, retained earnings would be reduced by the amount of dividends
paid and the taxes incurred. If the amount of dividends remains constant, ending retained earnings
should remain the same as under the system without integration because the corporation's actual
cash outflow would not change.
2.30 The most important impact the dividends-paid deduction method would have on a
corporation's financial statements is the temporary lack of comparability between different periods.
However, adequate footnote disclosure can mitigate this lack of comparability.
Financial
statements from periods prior to the adoption of integration would not be comparable to
statements from periods after adoption, because the dividends-paid deduction method permanently
reduces the amount of taxes due by the paying corporation. Hence, this method increases the
amount reported as net income by the income tax savings received from the deduction of the
amount distributed. Adoption of this method would increase retained earnings by the same
amount. For corporations that pay large amounts of dividends, this increase could be substantial.
2.31 The flow-through method presents the same comparability problems as the dividends-paid
deduction method. Income reported in financial statements prior to adoption of integration would
not be comparable to income reported in statements after adoption. The corporation no longer
would have a tax liability, since shareholders would report all corporate earnings. 63 Again, proper
footnote disclosure should mitigate the temporary comparability problem. The amount of net
income reported on a corporation's financial statements should increase by the tax savings.
Retained earnings should also increase by the same amount.

TRANSITION
2.32 Two major options would need to be considered during transition to an integrated system:
(1) whether to phase in the integration system or adopt it immediately and (2) whether to extend
integration benefits to pre-enactment equity and/or pre-enactment earnings. The loss of revenue
caused by integration could be reduced by phasing in the system at the cost of added complexity.
Another justification for a phase-in period would be to reduce the first-year windfall created by the
increase in stock prices that immediate integration could produce.
2.33 Distribution of pre-enactment earnings may be the most difficult area to administer. If
integration applied only to distributions out of post-enactment earnings, the system would need
to stipulate an appropriate ordering of distributions and provide for the maintenance of complex
records to account for them correctly. Some countries that have adopted integration levy a
compensatory tax on distributions of pre-enactment earnings.
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Other countries, for example Germany, generally have not adopted integration below the federal level.
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A similar comparability problem occurs when a corporation converts from a C corporation to an S corporation.
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2.34 If the integration system distinguished between old and new equity, additional problems
could occur because the different issues of stock would have different benefits and values. If only
new equity received integration benefits, these shares would be more valuable than the older
shares. Thus, shareholders of the older stock would be at a disadvantage in the marketplace.
This distinction between old and new equity also would add complexity to the system, as
corporations would be required to keep records of the percentage of old and new equity issued
and, in the case of the shareholder-credit method, the names of the shareholders who own the
new equity. This detailed recordkeeping could become quite burdensome as additional shares of
stock were bought and sold.
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Chapter 3
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH INTEGRATION

3.1
Many countries, including most major industrialized nations, have adopted a system of
integration. Some form of the shareholder credit appears to have been almost universally adopted,
but each country employs different rules within the shareholder-credit method to achieve
integration. Several countries initially adopted a split-rate tax system, 64 but currently all of them
have either changed entirely to the shareholder-credit method or employ the split-rate and
shareholder-credit systems simultaneously. 65 Countries abandoned the split-rate system because
of the problems associated with distributions of previously taxed income and of earnings that were
not fully taxed at the corporate level. 66 The flow-through method also came under consideration
in Canada and Germany, but because of the many problems encountered, both countries decided
to forgo adopting such a system. 67
3.2
It is a truism that the experiences of other countries in implementing their systems should
benefit the United States if it decides to adopt integration. However, because of cultural and
political differences, the results in the United States may vary from those in other countries. The
following discussion examines the integration systems adopted by Canada, Japan, the United
Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, and Australia. The systems have been grouped according to
how they account for tax preferences.68

PASS-THROUGH OF CORPORATE TAX PREFERENCES TO SHAREHOLDERS
3.3
When the shareholder-credit method permits the pass-through of corporate tax preferences,
the credit allowed may be larger than the total tax paid. Only two of the countries studied,
Canada and Japan, pass through preferences to shareholders.
Canada
3.4
In 1972, Canada adopted its current method of integration, which is perhaps the most
generous to shareholders. It employs a shareholder-credit system requiring shareholders to gross
up income by 25 percent of total dividends received. The method allows the shareholder a credit
of 16.67 percent against the national tax, with the remainder of the gross up being allowed as a
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A split-rate system normally taxes distributed income at a lower rate than retained earnings. Both Germany
and Japan have used a split-rate system.
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See appendix C, "Degree of Reduction of Economic Double Taxation in OECD Countries."
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See Radler and Edwards, "The Split-Rate of Corporation Income Tax in Germany — A Tax Advantage for
Foreign Owned Subsidiaries," Common Market Report (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, [1963, transfer
binder]), 9 0 5 1 . Reasons cited for changing from the split-rate system in Japan include the need to eliminate
unnecessary complexities and unfairness in distributions of nontaxable income that a split-rate system creates.
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See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "The Treatment of Corporate Preference Items Under an Integrated Tax System:
A Comparative Analysis," Tax Lawyer 44, no. 1, 197-198.
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This grouping follows a study performed by Avi-Yonah and reported in "The Treatment of Corporate Preference
Items Under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis." See appendixes D and E for a comparison
of the aforementioned countries' methods of tax integration and their respective combined corporate and
shareholder tax burdens based on different levels of earnings distributions.
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credit against provincial taxes. The credit can be used only to the extent that the shareholder has
current-year tax liability; unused credits are not refundable and cannot be carried backward or
forward.
3.5
Because the credit is nonrefundable, the Canadian system does not extend integration
benefits to either tax-exempt or foreign shareholders. Foreign taxes paid by domestic corporations
are integrated with the individual tax system, which means the system does not discriminate
against foreign-source income. By adopting a fixed rate of credit without levying a compensatory
tax, the Canadian system permits income that has not been fully taxed at the corporate level
because of corporate tax preferences to be passed through to the shareholders tax-free.
3.6
The level of integration this system allows depends on the effective tax rate of the
corporation paying the dividend. In most cases, only partial integration results, because the
national tax plus the provincial tax exceeds the credit of 25 percent. However, some corporations
receive full integration, and corporations with an effective tax rate of less than 20 percent
(combined federal and provincial taxation) receive "super integration" benefits. 69
Super
integration occurs because shareholders still receive a credit equal to 25 percent, even though the
corporation pays tax at a lower rate. The Canadian method is the only system that allows super
integration.
Japan
3.7
Japan originally adopted a system of integration in 1 9 6 1 . Until April 1 , 1990, it employed
a method that included both a shareholder credit and a split-rate component. Tax reform enacted
in 1987 eliminated the split-rate component, leaving only the shareholder-credit system. The
current system allows a 10 percent credit to taxpayers with a total income of ten million yen or
less, while those with income in excess of this amount receive a 5 percent credit. 70 Shareholders
are not required to gross up income by the allowable credit. The credit rate differential coupled
with the absence of gross up results in corporate income's being subjected to progressive tax
rates. This method does not permit the credit to be refunded if it is not used in the current tax
year and shareholders cannot carry any unused credit backward or forward.
3.8
The Japanese system does not grant integration benefits to either foreign or tax-exempt
shareholders. Generally, the system does not integrate foreign-source income. Special exceptions
to this rule can be made through bilateral treaty provisions.
3.9
The system also permits corporations to pass through the benefits of all corporate tax
preferences to the shareholders without levying a compensatory tax. However, this issue is not
as critical in Japan as in other countries, because the Japanese tax code allows only a minimal
number of corporate preferences. As an additional measure to limit the benefits derived from the
pass-through of corporate tax preferences, Japan levies a "liquidation tax" on any unrealized
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Super integration occurs if a corporation has an effective tax rate of less than 20 percent, because the
shareholder effectively receives a 25 percent credit. For example, if the effective tax rate is 20 percent, a
corporation with $100 pre-tax income is subject to $20 tax and has $80 after-tax income. The shareholder
receives an $80 dividend with a 25 percent credit. This results in a gross-up shareholder credit of $20, which
compares to the $20 of tax paid by the corporation. If, instead, the effective tax rate on a corporation is 15
percent, a corporation with $100 pre-tax income is subject to $15 tax and has $85 after-tax income. The
shareholder receives an $85 dividend with a 25 percent credit, which results in a gross-up shareholder credit
of $21.25. Super integration occurs because the shareholder credit allowed exceeds the corporate tax paid
($21.25- $15 = $6.25).

70

Ten million yen is equal to approximately $80,000, as of July 1992.
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appreciation within the corporation whenever the company liquidates or merges with another
corporation. This tax helps to ensure that the corporation pays at least one level of tax on income
excluded from taxation because of tax preferences.

ADVANCE CORPORATION TAX
3.10 One method used to prevent the pass-through of corporate tax preferences to shareholders
is the advance corporation tax (ACT). This method has been adopted by only one country, the
United Kingdom, because of the many complexities and revenue considerations involved in
implementation.
United Kingdom
3.11 Under the United Kingdom's system, corporations remit an ACT payment each time they
make a dividend distribution. 71 Individual shareholders gross up dividends by the ACT payment
and take a credit against their tax liability for the same amount. The government refunds any
excess ACT to the shareholder. In addition, the payment of the ACT partially reduces the payor
corporation's tax liability for the year in which the dividend is paid. This reduction is restricted to
the portion of the corporate income tax rate equal to the basic rate of individual taxation (currently,
the corporate rate is 33 percent and the basic rate is 25 percent so 2 5 /33 of the corporate tax may
be offset by ACT). However, the system does not allow any excess to be refunded to the
corporation. Instead, a corporation can carry excess ACT back six years to offset its tax liability
in those years, and it can carry excess ACT forward indefinitely to reduce its tax liability in future
years.
3.12 Corporate shareholders do not receive the benefit of the credit because intercorporate
dividends are not taxable. Instead, the recipient corporation maintains a record of this income in
a franking account, and the corporation's share of the credit passes through to its individual
shareholders on subsequent distribution by the second corporation, which can reduce its own ACT
payments by the ACT associated with the dividend received. ACT is not levied on distributions
from subsidiaries to corporate shareholders holding over 50 percent of the shares if appropriate
elections are filed.
3.13 The United Kingdom's system does not provide integration benefits to foreign-source
income, but it does allow some relief to foreign-source income through the use of foreign tax
credits. To minimize the loss of these credits, the government determines that dividends are paid
out of domestic income first. 72 Normally, integration benefits are not extended to foreign
shareholders, although exceptions can be made on a treaty-by-treaty basis. 73
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The amount of the ACT payment equals the distribution multiplied by the basic rate of individual tax divided
by one minus the basic rate. Currently, the basic rate is 25 percent. Therefore, the equation for the
calculation of the ACT payment is D x .25/ (1 - .25) = 1/3 D, where D represents the total amount distributed.
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See Emil M. Sunley, "International Aspects of Integration," Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation
(1979), 2 2 9 2 - 2 2 9 7 .
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For example, under the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, a refund of one-half of the ACT is made to a U.S. company
owning 10 percent or more of the voting power in the U.K. company paying the dividend, subject to a 5
percent withholding tax on the sum of the dividend and the refund of one-half of the ACT. Other U.S.
shareholders are entitled to a refund of the entire ACT, but they are subject to a 15 percent withholding tax
on the sum of the dividend and the ACT refund. To illustrate, for a dividend of £75, an ACT of £25 applies.

A 10 percent U.S. corporate shareholder receives the dividend of £75 plus an ACT refund of £12.5 less a
(continued...)
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3.14 Unlike most other countries, the United Kingdom grants integration benefits to tax-exempt
organizations by allowing a refund of the ACT credit to these shareholders. Furthermore, by
levying the ACT, the system disallows the pass-through of corporate tax preferences to
shareholders, which helps to ensure that nontaxable income cannot be distributed tax-free. In the
United Kingdom, the ACT functions as a minimum tax ensuring that the system levies at least one
level of tax on all income.
3.15 The United Kingdom's ACT system produces an artificial amount of credit because the
credit bears no relationship to the amount of tax paid by the corporation. Instead, the amount of
the credit relies on the level of distributions made by each corporation. Problems also occur in this
system when corporations have net operating losses, engage in reorganizations, pay intercorporate
dividends, or have foreign-source income. 74 These difficulties may account for why this type of
ACT system has not been adopted by any other country.

COMPENSATORY TAX AND TRACKING OF INCOME
3.16 Tracking income and levying a compensatory tax provides another method that prevents
the pass-through of corporate tax preferences to shareholders. The simplicity and accuracy of this
type of system varies greatly, depending upon the rules adopted by each country. Italy, France,
and Germany have all adopted some form of this method.
Italy
3.17 Italy adopted a shareholder-credit method of integration in 1977. The Italian system
achieves full integration by allowing a shareholder credit of 56.25 percent on all dividends received
from domestic corporations. Since shareholders must gross up their dividends by this amount,
they receive a net credit equal to 36 percent, the same as the full national corporate tax rate. 75
The system allows refunds to shareholders for any credit not used in the current year.
3.18 Italy does not permit integration benefits to be extended to foreign-source income; instead,
corporations are allowed a 60 percent deduction for dividends from related foreign corporations,
and other shareholders receive the benefit of foreign tax credits as a means of reducing the excess
tax on foreign-source income. The system also does not extend integration benefits to foreign or
tax-exempt shareholders.
3.19 The Italian system prevents the pass-through of preferences by requiring corporations to
track income. Under this method, corporations must maintain records of all income and
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(...continued)
withholding tax of £4.375, for a net cash receipt of £83.125. Other U.S. shareholders receive the dividend
of £75 plus an ACT refund of £25 less a withholding tax of £15, for a net cash receipt of £85.
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A more detailed description of the problems encountered under the United Kingdom's version of ACT can be
found in Avi-Yonah, "The Treatment of Corporate Preference Items Under an Integrated Tax System: A
Comparative Analysis," 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 .
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Assuming that a corporation has $100 of taxable income, the corporate tax rate equals 36 percent, and the
corporation distributes all after-tax income, distributions of $64 ($100- $36) would be made. The shareholder
must gross up income by $36 ($64 x .5625). Therefore, the shareholder reports total income of $100 ($64
in dividends received plus a $36 gross up). At a 40 percent individual tax rate, the shareholder pays a tax of
$40 less a credit of $36. This results in a net tax of $4. The shareholder would have a net receipt of $60
($64 dividend less $4 tax). Thus, distributions of corporate income are taxed at the shareholder's tax rate.
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distributions. Dividends are considered to be paid out of fully taxable income first. Distributions
in excess of fully taxable income are subject to a compensatory tax.

France
3.20 France's method of integration, although similar to the Italian system, is more accurate and,
therefore, more complex. The French system, adopted in 1965, allows a shareholder credit of
50 percent on all dividends received by domestic shareholders, who must gross up dividends by
the amount of the allowable credit. 76 This system produces substantially full integration because
it allows credits equal to 3 3 /34 of corporate taxes. Shareholders lose the benefit of credits not used
in the current year, because these credits are not refundable.
3.21 France's territorial system of taxation allows foreign-source income to escape taxation,
eliminating the need for both allowances for foreign tax credits and the extension of integration
benefits to foreign-source income. Generally, foreign shareholders receive no integration benefits,
but exceptions can be made by special provisions on a treaty-by-treaty basis. 77 The system
grants integration benefits to pension plans and tax-exempt organizations that fulfill a public
interest, but excludes all other tax-exempt shareholders.78
3.22 The system precludes the pass-through of corporate tax preferences to shareholders by
requiring corporations to track income by specifying it as either fully taxed or non-fully taxed. A
compensatory tax, equal to the credit attached to the dividend, applies to any portion of the
distributions made out of income not fully taxed at the corporate level. Distributions are deemed
to be made from the current year's fully taxed income first, then out of fully taxed income earned
in the past four years, and finally out of non-fully taxed income.
Germany
3.23 In 1977, Germany changed from a split-rate system only to an integration system
combining the split-rate and shareholder-credit methods. The split-rate system levies a 50 percent
tax 79 on retained earnings and a 36 percent tax on distributed earnings, whereas the shareholder
credit achieves full integration on distributed earnings by granting a credit equal to 36 percent of
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Assuming that a corporation has $100 of taxable income, the corporate tax rate equals 34 percent, and the
corporation distributes all after-tax income, distributions of $66 ($ 100 - $34) would be made. The shareholder
must gross up income by $33 ($66 x .5). Therefore, the shareholder reports a total income of $99 ($66
dividends received plus a $33 gross up). At a 40 percent individual tax rate, the shareholder pays a tax of
$39.60 less a credit of $33. This results in a net tax of $6.60. The shareholder would have a net receipt of
$59.40 ($66 dividend less $6.60 tax).
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For example, under the tax treaty between the United States and France, a U.S. company owning 10 percent
or more of the voting power in the French company paying the dividend is entitled to no refund of avoir fiscal
but is subject to a 5 percent withholding rate. Other U.S. shareholders are entitled to a refund of the entire
avoir fiscal but are subject to a 15 percent withholding rate on both the dividend and the avoir fiscal refund.
To illustrate, for a dividend on 1,000 francs, an avoir fiscal of 500 francs applies. A 10 percent U.S. corporate
shareholder receives the dividend of 1,000 francs less a withholding tax of 50 francs for a net cash receipt
of 950 francs. Other U.S. shareholders receive the dividend of 1,000 francs plus the avoir fiscal refund of 500
francs less a withholding tax of 225 francs, for a net cash receipt of 1275 francs.
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See Harry G. Gouervitch, "Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experience," The Tax Lawyer 3 1 , no. 1,
(Fall 1977), 65-112.
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Since 1990, the system has levied a 50 percent tax on retained earnings. Before then, retained earnings were
taxed at a 56 percent rate.

26

gross dividends (56.25 percent of net dividends). In return, the shareholder must gross up
dividends by the same amount. The credit, if not used in the current year, may then be refunded
to domestic taxable shareholders.
3.24 The system does not extend the shareholder credit benefits to foreign-source income.
Instead, a corporation can avoid one level of tax on foreign income through the use of a
tax-sparing credit that the government grants for income earned from less developed countries,
through tax treaty, or through the use of foreign tax credits. 80 Neither foreign shareholders nor
tax-exempt organizations receive shareholder-credit integration benefits. The system precludes
the pass-through of corporate tax preferences to the shareholder by levying a compensatory tax
on all distributions out of non-fully taxed income. Germany requires the tracking of income through
the use of the most sophisticated system of its kind, in which corporations maintain multiple
income accounts based on the rate of tax paid and the nature of any tax-exempt income.

TRACKING OF INCOME TAXES PAID
3.25 The last method employed to prevent the pass-through of corporate tax preferences to
shareholders requires the tracking of income taxes paid. This method, which has been adopted
by Australia, prevents pass-through of preferences by limiting the allowable credit to the total
amount of taxes paid.
Australia
3.26 Australia adopted a shareholder-credit system of integration in 1987. 8 1 If a corporation
pays the full corporate rate of 39 percent, the Australian system allows a full shareholder credit
for taxes paid by the corporation. If the corporation pays dividends out of income not taxed at the
full corporate rate, the Australian system reduces the allowable credit. Shareholders are required
to gross up income by the amount of the credit. The system does not permit the credit to be
refunded or to be carried backward or forward. Therefore, shareholders lose the benefit of the
credit if it is not fully used during the year in which the dividend giving rise to the credit was
received.
3.27 The Australian system does not grant integration benefits to foreign tax paid on
foreign-source income. However, the system allows foreign tax credits to the recipient of the
foreign-source income in respect of the foreign tax paid. In addition, foreign shareholders receive
integration benefits only to the extent of any withholding tax payable on the dividend to the
foreign shareholder. With a few exceptions, integration benefits also are not extended to
dividends paid to tax-exempt organizations.
3.28 Australia has benefitted from its observations of other countries' experiences with
corporate tax preferences and has chosen to adopt a unique method that prevents the
pass-through of preferences. Under this method, the corporation must maintain a franking system
that keeps track of the maximum amount of dividends that can be distributed and still receive the
full credit. 82 The corporation determines the percentage of its income to be franked, and also
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See Sunley, "International Aspects of Integration, 2295.
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New Zealand adopted a system of integration very similar to the Australian system a year later, in 1988.
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The corporate tax paid, multiplied by one minus the corporate tax rate, divided by the corporate tax rate
represents the increase in the franking account. For example, if a corporation has $ 100 in income and pays
a tax of $39, the franking account is increased by $61 ($39 x([1-.39]/.39).
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is responsible for reporting to the shareholders the proper taxable amount of dividends and the
available credit. Because the franking system tracks and accounts for all taxes paid, preventing
pass-through of preferences to shareholders becomes less difficult. Because of the varying ratios
of credit available on distributions, this system becomes significantly more complex at the
shareholder level than a system that levies a compensatory tax at the corporate level.
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Chapter 4
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE INTEGRATION METHODS

4.1
The AICPA studied and evaluated six alternative methods of integration. Three methods —
the flow-through method, the dividends-paid deduction method, and the shareholder-credit
method — are the most widely recognized alternatives. These methods will be discussed in detail
in this section. Three other methods of implementing integration — the repeal of the corporate
tax, the split-rate corporate-level tax, and the dividend-exclusion method — were also studied.
These methods will be discussed later in this section.

FLOW-THROUGH METHOD
4.2
The flow-through method eliminates the corporate-level income tax by allocating a
corporation's income or loss proportionately among all its shareholders and imposing tax
consequences at the shareholder level. This method results in complete integration of both
distributed and retained earnings, and has the effect of treating a regular C corporation in a manner
similar to the way a partnership or an S corporation is treated under current law. 83
Fairness
4.3
Full integration should eliminate the vertical and horizontal inequities in the current system,
because all corporate income items would be taxed once at the shareholder's applicable tax rate.
Horizontal equity should result because the tax rate on corporate income would be the same as
the rate applied to other sources of income, whereas the use of a progressive tax system at the
shareholder level achieves vertical equity.
Debt Versus Equity
4.4
Full integration would reduce the tax bias favoring debt financing over equity financing.
Since both corporate earnings and interest income would be taxed only at the shareholder or
creditor level, debt financing would not have the significant advantages over equity that it
currently enjoys for tax purposes. On the other hand, to the extent that foreign and tax-exempt
shareholders are fully taxed on their allocated income, debt financing may continue to be favored
by such investors.
Retention of Earnings
4.5
Since the flow-through method taxes all income when earned, a corporation would not have
a tax incentive to retain earnings at the corporate level. In fact, profitable corporations would be
faced with the need to distribute some part of their earnings to cover shareholder taxes imposed
on the allocated income.
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Simplified rules for reporting the flow-through of items for large partnerships have been proposed, first in the
Tax Simplification Act of 1991 and again in the Economic Growth Acceleration Act of 1992 (H.R. 4210, 102d
Cong., 2d sess. Sec. 4301 [1992]). These rules attempt to simplify the manner in which large partnerships
communicate tax information to their partners. If enacted as proposed, these measures would make the
flow-through method more attractive as an integration alternative.
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Ease of Administration
4.6
Full integration appears simple to implement, assuming that all earnings (ordinary and
capital gains) are taxed at the same rate and all tax preferences are eliminated. Corporate tax
preferences add complexity to the method because each item must be separately stated and
treated correctly. The appearance of simplicity may be illusionary because of the problems that
surface under this method (these will be discussed later). In addition, corporations must maintain
complex records to transmit accurately the required data to each shareholder.
4.7
A large publicly traded company would find it nearly impossible to report income
determined on a daily basis to its numerous shareholders. Since a shareholder's basis would be
increased or decreased by the allocated corporate income or loss, the calculation of a shareholder's
basis for gains and losses also would become difficult if income could be properly allocated.
Allocating a full year's income to the shareholders of record at either the first or the last day of
the taxable year or at periodic intervals during the taxable year would provide one solution to this
problem. 84 In this way, because of the adjustments made to basis, the difference between the
amount of income or loss that should have been allocated to a shareholder and the amount
actually reported on the shareholder's income tax return would be approximately offset at the time
of sale of the shares of stock. As long as the ordinary income and capital gains tax rates are
approximately the same, the difference in tax effect should be minimal (but only if capital losses
are fully deductible). The current limitations on capital losses cause a problem if the shareholder
recognizes a loss on the stock sale.85
International
4.8
To ensure that corporate income is subject to at least one level of tax, the United States
would need to impose a withholding tax on income earned by foreign shareholders. However, a
withholding tax would require the renegotiation of most existing tax treaties. The withholding tax
could be reduced or eliminated for foreign shareholders if the shareholder's country of residence
were to provide reciprocal treaty benefits to U.S. shareholders. Providing reciprocal benefits under
the flow-through method could be difficult because this method has not been adopted in any other
country.
Tax-Exempt Organizations
4.9
Since tax-exempt shareholders do not currently pay tax on their dividend income, the
flow-through method could cause substantial amounts of corporate income to escape taxation if
income allocated to tax-exempt shareholders was not taxed. This issue could be addressed by
either requiring corporations to withhold a nonrefundable percentage of the income allocated to
tax-exempt organizations or taxing the income allocated to tax-exempt shareholders as unrelated
trade or business income. Taxing the allocated income as unrelated trade or business income
would create a distinction between the taxation of earnings on equity investment and the taxation
of earnings on debt investment. It is unclear to what extent this different tax treatment would
result in portfolio shifts by tax-exempt organizations.
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This method of allocating income could create market distortions at the time income is reported as taxable.
It could also lead to income shifting strategies unless special anti-abuse rules were adopted.
Under the current system, if the shareholder has no other capital gains, the loss would be limited to $3,000

a year for individual shareholders and totally disallowed for corporate shareholders, possibly causing a
significant tax effect for either type of shareholder.
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Corporate Tax Preferences
4.10 A decision would have to be made about whether to pass corporate tax preferences
through to shareholders under the flow-through method. The pass-through of tax preferences
would create added complexities and would also raise tax policy issues. For example, the
deemed-paid foreign tax credit under IRC Section 902 currently is allowed only to 10 percent
corporate shareholders.
Retained Earnings
4.11 The flow-through method extends integration benefits to retained earnings by increasing
the shareholder's basis by the amount of the corporation's income, both distributed and
undistributed. Thus, the gain on the sale of stock attributable to retained taxable income is offset
by the basis adjustment.
Intercorporate Dividends
4.12 The dividends-received deduction allowed under current law should be eliminated under this
method, since intercorporate income is taxed only at the final level. Intercorporate earnings would
be passed through and reported in a manner similar to the way income within tiered partnerships
is reported under current law. Tracking of all income and tax prepayments (if applicable) would
be required to ensure that corporate income is properly reported. However, tracking income
through a tiered corporate structure adds complexity to the method.
State Taxation
4.13 Under the flow-through method, the computation of federal taxable income for corporations
need not be affected. 86 If adopted, a state method of integration could result in numerous state
filings by shareholders, which would increase the complexity of the method. Shareholders could
be taxed in the states in which the corporation does business, as in the current method of taxing
partnership income that some states employ. Inconsistencies in integration methods among states
also would increase complexity.
4.14 The potential exists for a substantial loss of revenue under this method. Several factors
must be considered in determining whether a state's tax revenue would increase or decrease if
integration were adopted. 87 These factors include the average corporate tax rate (whether it is
higher or lower than the average individual rate), state and federal taxes (whether they are
deductible when computing state taxable income), the corporate dividend payout rate, and the
redistribution of income from corporations to shareholders.
Level of Compliance
4.15 The flow-through method may not have as high a compliance rate as the shareholder-credit
method, because it relies on the shareholders to report all income. This problem could be solved
by the inclusion of a prepayment mechanism that would require the corporation to pay a tax on
all earnings, whether or not distributed. Shareholders would be allowed a credit for the prepaid
tax. This process would ensure greater compliance, since the corporation, not the shareholder,
would pay the tax.
86

The calculation of taxable income under this method resembles the calculation for S corporations in which
taxable income does not change but the taxpayer is subject to tax.
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See the discussion of reallocation of income on page 15.
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Changes to Prior Income
4.16 Changes made to a corporation's taxable income for prior years (for example, as a result
of an IRS audit or the filing of an amended tax return) create another problem under the
flow-through method. A change in corporate income could affect numerous shareholder income
tax returns for prior years. Some of these shareholders may no longer own shares of the
corporation when the changes are made. This problem could be solved by requiring the current
shareholders to report any changes in a prior year's income in the current year. Having current
shareholders report income from a prior period in which they may not have owned any stock may
be justifiable, assuming the market price of stock reflects a contingent tax liability for potential
changes in corporate taxable income. Another possible solution would require the corporation, not
the shareholders, to pay any additional taxes.
Net Operating Losses
4.17 Under the flow-through method, there are three alternatives to deducting net operating
losses. The shareholder could (1) be allowed to deduct losses in full without any limitations, (2)
be allowed to deduct losses limited to the shareholder's basis in the stock, or (3) not be allowed
to deduct losses at all. If there are no limitations on the deduction of corporate losses, numerous
issues similar to those that arose with respect to tax shelters would need to be addressed.
Different C/asses of Stock
4.18 The increased use of preferred stock, stock options, and stock warrants has made the
capital structure of many corporations very complex. Multiple classes of stock make the
implementation of the flow-through method difficult because of the complexity of calculating
income allocations between classes of stock. For example, allocation and tracking issues could
arise if corporations retained earnings allocated to common stockholders and subsequently used
these earnings to pay preferred dividends.
Cash Flow
4.19 If the corporation retains a substantial amount of earnings and if there is no prepayment
of shareholder tax by the corporation or the prepayment rate is lower than the shareholder's
marginal tax rate, a shareholder cash flow problem could arise because the flow-through method
taxes all corporate income, whether or not distributed. Depending on the prepayment rate (if any)
and the level of distributions, shareholders could incur a tax liability in excess of cash received
from the corporation.
Taxable Year
4.20 As with partnerships and S corporations, when the tax year-end for the corporation and the
shareholder differs, a potential for tax deferral exists. The system could allow corporations to
adopt or retain fiscal year-ends with certain restrictions, but such a provision would further
complicate the method.
Transition
4.21 Since the flow-through method would tax corporate income when earned, shareholders
would not be subject to tax when such income was distributed. Special provisions may be needed
to account for distributions made out of earnings accumulated prior to the enactment of
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integration. To ensure that only one level of tax is paid on all income, shareholders would be
required to adjust the basis of their stock by their share of income, losses, and distributions. This
basis adjustment would be similar to the current adjustments made by partners and S corporation
shareholders.88
Advantages and Disadvantages
4.22

The following are the advantages of the flow-through method:
•

It permits both distributed income and retained earnings to receive integration benefits.

•

It achieves horizontal and vertical equity.

•

It reduces the bias between debt and equity.

The following are its disadvantages:
•

It requires maintenance
shareholders.

of complex

records to transmit

substantial

data to

•

Its complexity increases when corporate tax preferences are passed through to
shareholders.

•

It presents difficulties in allocating income to owners of different classes of stock and
to shares disposed of during the year.

•

It causes complications when changes are made to prior-year income amounts.

•

It creates cash flow problems for shareholders if corporations do not distribute
sufficient amounts to fund their tax liabilities.

•

It raises compliance problems unless the system implements a withholding mechanism.

DIVIDENDS-PAID DEDUCTION METHOD
4.23 The dividends-paid deduction method allows the corporation a deduction for dividends paid,
while taxing shareholders when they receive distributions. Under this method, the corporation
enjoys the direct benefit from the elimination of corporate tax on distributed income. In theory,
this method would allow corporations to increase their dividend payments if they did not totally
reinvest the tax savings. 89

88

IRC Sections 705 and 1367.

89

Assuming a corporation has a taxable income of $200 and requires an earnings retention of $40, under the
current tax system that corporation could make a dividend distribution of $92.00 ($200 income - $68 tax $40 retained earnings) under the current tax system. In contrast, if the corporation can deduct dividend
payments and continue to retain the same amount of earnings, dividend distributions would equal
approximately $140 ($200 income - [$200 income- $140 dividend x .34 percent tax] - $40 retained earnings).
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Fairness and Debt Versus Equity
4.24 To the extent that earnings are distributed, a single tax would result at the shareholder's
progressive tax rates, ensuring horizontal and vertical equity at the level of corporate distributions.
Since this method treats dividends virtually the same as it treats interest, it should substantially
eliminate the tax bias towards debt.
Retention of Earnings
4.25 Under the dividends-paid deduction method, the corporation receives the integration benefit
directly in the form of reduced corporate tax, which in turn increases funds available for
investment (assuming there is no increase in dividends paid). This corporate-level tax benefit
reduces the tax incentive to retain earnings.
Ease of Administration
4.26 The dividends-paid deduction method is the simplest form of integration because its
implementation affects only the corporation. However, without any special provisions, this
method would allow some corporate profits to completely escape taxation, since a deduction is
automatically granted for all dividends paid, including those to foreign residents and tax-exempt
organizations. A withholding mechanism (nonrefundable with respect to dividends paid to foreign
and tax-exempt shareholders) that requires a corporation to withhold a fixed percentage of the
distributed income would permit this income to be taxed. 90 However, a withholding mechanism
would add significant complexity to the method.
international
4.27 Foreign shareholders usually benefit from a substantial reduction in withholding taxes under
U.S. tax treaties. Under the dividends-paid deduction method, these reduced rates would cause
corporate income to be subject to less than a full single level of tax. To compensate for the
reduced tax, the United States would have to increase the withholding rates on dividends.
Increasing withholding rates would require many treaties to be renegotiated.
4.28 The dividends-paid deduction method also differs from the methods adopted by other
countries. This difference would complicate the ability of the United States to negotiate reciprocal
integration benefits with other countries. 91

90

A withholding mechanism would involve policy considerations relating to whether tax-exempt organizations
should receive full or partial benefits, thus extending their current advantageous position as compared with
taxable entities. In addition, there would be both policy and treaty considerations relating to whether foreign
shareholders should receive full or partial benefits.

91

For example, if the United States allowed a 100 percent dividends-paid deduction, under many existing tax
treaties, a foreign shareholder in a U.S. corporation could receive a distribution of $100 of pre-tax corporate
income subject to only a $5 withholding tax based on the reduced treaty withholding rate of 5 percent.
Currently, a similar distribution to a foreign shareholder would be subject to a $34 corporate-level tax, plus a
$3.30 withholding tax on the net $66 distribution. To deny this windfall benefit to the foreign shareholder and
subject the distribution to the present overall tax rate, the treaty would need to be renegotiated to provide a
37.3 percent withholding rate on the dividend. At the same time, the United States would want to maintain
the existing reciprocal 5 percent treaty rate on dividends paid by foreign corporations to U.S. shareholders.
The ability of the United States to negotiate this result is doubtful.
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Tax-Exempt Organizations
4.29 Absent special treatment for dividends paid to tax-exempt shareholders, a portion of a
corporation's earnings would not be subject to any income tax. If this is not the desired result,
dividends paid to tax-exempt shareholders could be treated as unrelated trade or business income
or a withholding mechanism could be implemented. Either approach would complicate the
administration of the method. If withholding is adopted, the amount of tax withheld that is
attributable to tax-exempt shareholders would have to be treated as a nonrefundable credit. It is
not clear to what extent this would cause a portfolio shift from equity to debt.
Corporate Tax Preferences
4.30 If a full dividend deduction were allowed against corporate income, as reduced by
preferences, this method would be relatively simple to administer. However, if corporate tax
preferences were passed through to shareholders, the amount of the distributions attributable to
preference items would have to be excluded from the shareholder's income. Alternatively, taxing
shareholders on the full amount of all distributions would limit the pass-through of preferences.
If corporate tax preferences are not allowed to be passed through to shareholders, the corporation
loses some of the benefit of the integration system because earnings must be retained by the
corporation to maximize the use of preferences.
Retained Earnings
4.31 The dividends-paid deduction method is designed to provide integration benefits only with
respect to distributed income. However, the method could be modified to extend benefits to
retained earnings by allowing shareholders to adjust the basis of their stock by the amount of
retained earnings allocated to the stock, in a manner similar to the flow-through method. This
alternative would add significant complexity to implementation of the method and could be
impracticable if it also required shareholders to report in income the retained earnings allocated to
their stock.
Intercorporate Dividends
4.32 If corporations are allowed a full deduction for dividends paid, corporate shareholders
should not be allowed a deduction for dividends received. Therefore, the dividends-received
deduction would need to be eliminated to avoid duplicate deductions by both the payor and the
payee of intercorporate dividends.
State Taxation
4.33 Federal adoption of the dividends-paid deduction method need not significantly affect state
tax administration. States that wish to adopt a method of integration could use federal taxable
income. However, employing this method at the state level would generally redirect the incidence
of tax from the state of corporate business activity to the state of shareholder residence. On the
other hand, if states did not adopt integration, the computation of state taxable income would
need to be adjusted for the amount of the federal dividends-paid deduction.
Level of Compliance
4.34 Unless the dividends-paid deduction method included a withholding mechanism coupled
with a shareholder credit, the risk of noncompliance would be greater with this method than with
other methods. If withholding were required, corporations would deduct and then remit to the
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government a fixed percentage of all dividends before distributing the remainder to the
shareholders. Although the level of compliance would increase with a withholding mechanism,
the added complexity and administrative recordkeeping requirements would reduce or eliminate
the major advantage of this method.
Changes to Prior Income
4.35 Any changes in a corporation's prior years' tax liability (for example, by IRS audit or
amended tax returns) should present less of a problem under this method. Since the corporation
enjoys all the benefits of integration, any changes made affect only one taxpayer. Furthermore,
because changes to income do not normally affect distributions, the deduction allowed to the
corporation should not be altered.
Transition
4.36 In the transition to a dividends-paid deduction method, several issues would need to be
considered. These issues include whether integration benefits would apply to existing equity
investments, to preenactment earnings, or to both. Limiting integration to post enactment equity
or earnings would add additional complexity to the operation of this method.
Advantages and Disadvantages
4.37

The following are the advantages of the dividends-paid deduction method:
•

It allows for ease in administration.

•

It achieves both horizontal and vertical equity at the shareholder level.

•

It reduces or eliminates the inequity between debt and equity.

•

It increases after-tax cash flow to the corporation.

The following are its disadvantages:
•

It grants relief only to distributed earnings.

•

It grants all tax benefits at the corporate level.

•

It grants the full benefit of integration with respect to distributions on stock regardless
of the tax status of shareholders.

•

It becomes more complicated to administer if the system limits corporate tax
preferences.

•

It does not easily interface with foreign integration systems.

•

It requires many current foreign tax treaties to be renegotiated.

SHAREHOLDER-CREDIT METHOD
4.38 The shareholder-credit method achieves integration by allowing shareholders a credit
against the tax imposed on dividend income. Under this method, the corporation would continue
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to pay tax on its earnings. Shareholders would gross up their incomes by the amount of tax paid
by the corporation that is attributable to distributed earnings. Shareholders would receive a credit
for their portion of the tax allocated to dividends.
4.39 The tax relief would be entirely at the shareholder level. Theoretically, this relief would
allow corporations to decrease dividend payouts, because shareholders would require fewer actual
cash dividends to receive the same after-tax benefits. On the other hand, shareholders might put
additional pressure on corporations to maintain their dividend distribution levels so that they could
receive a larger benefit from the credit.
Fairness
4.40 The shareholder-credit method achieves horizontal equity by taxing distributed income only
once, at the shareholder tax rates. If the method allowed the credit to be taken against tax
imposed on other income or to be refunded, vertical equity also would result because all distributed
income would be taxed at the progressive individual tax rates.
Debt Versus Equity
4.41 For investors who are subject to income tax, equity should become relatively more
attractive because of the tax credit that accompanies dividend income. For these shareholders,
therefore, this method should reduce the existing bias in favor of debt investment. However,
corporations may still prefer debt financing because of its favored tax treatment at the corporate
level.
Retention of Earnings
4.42 The availability of a credit to offset all or a part of the shareholder-level tax on corporate
distributions would reduce the tax incentive for retaining earnings at the corporate level.
Ease of Administration
4.43 A shareholder-credit system would be relatively easy to administer if a fixed rate-credit
were used. 92 . However, if the credit was based on the effective tax rate of each separate
corporation, it would be more complicated to administer. Moreover, the method would be further
complicated if special rules were included for foreign shareholders, tax-exempt entities, and tax
preferences. 93
4.44 The disposition of stock during the year would not cause problems, since the credit would
be claimed by the shareholder who received the dividend. If the shareholder credit did not change

92

The 1992 Treasury Report does not recommend adoption of the shareholder-credit method, primarily on the
grounds of its presumed complexity, even though the report acknowledges that the credit method is the most
flexible in terms of responding to such important policy issues as the treatment of tax preferences, tax-exempt
investors, and foreign shareholders. The report concludes that the principal complexity of the credit method
is that it requires an entirely new regime for taxing corporate distributions, wherein shareholders would be
required to apply credits in determining their tax liabilities.

93

The 1992 Treasury Report preferred the dividend exclusion method to any form of the shareholder-credit
method because of simplification concerns.
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the shareholder's basis in the investment, the gain or loss on the sale of stock would be calculated
in the same manner as under the current system. 94
International
4.45 The ability of the shareholder-credit system to differentiate among special shareholders is
one of the major advantages of this method. For example, foreign taxpayers could receive the
shareholder credit if the shareholder's country of residence were to make reciprocal treaty
concessions. Most foreign countries have adopted a shareholder-credit method. Therefore, the
adoption of a similar method by the United States should simplify the interface between the U.S.
and foreign systems, facilitating the granting of reciprocal integration benefits.
4.46 In the case of foreign-source income earned by domestic corporations, a decision would
have to be made about whether to pass the benefit of foreign tax credits through to shareholders.
If the benefit of foreign tax credits were passed through to shareholders, the system would
become more difficult to administer and would incur a greater revenue loss.
Tax-Exempt Organizations
A.47 Special treatment of tax-exempt shareholders would be easier to address under the
shareholder-credit system. If it was determined that an advantage was to be given to tax-exempt
shareholders, the credit would need to be fully or partially refundable. On the other hand, because
the credit would be nonrefundable and not available for offset against unrelated trade or business
income tax, at least one level of tax would be imposed on all corporate income.
Corporate Tax Preferences
4.48 Although the possibility of complexity does exist in this system, the shareholder credit
should allow flexibility in addressing the issue of corporate tax preferences. 95 Tax preferences
could be passed through to the shareholders by means of a fixed rate of credit on all dividends.
However, if the pass-through of preferences was not desired, a compensatory tax could be levied
at the corporate level and a fixed rate of credit could be maintained for the shareholders.
Alternatively, the corporation's effective tax rate as it varies from year to year could be used as
the rate of credit, but this would add significant complexity to tax planning at the shareholder level
because the shareholder would need to be informed of the amount of credit associated with each
distribution.
Retained Earnings
4.49 The shareholder-credit method is designed to provide integration benefits for distributed
income. However, the method could be modified to extend benefits to retained earnings. One
approach would couple the adoption of the method with the elimination of the tax on stock sales.
This alternative, however, would also grant integration benefits to unrealized corporate income.
Another approach would adjust shareholder stock basis by the amount of retained earnings
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Taylor and Aidinoff, in "Approaches to Debt: Is Integration the Answer?" suggest that basis adjustments
similar to those made for partnerships and S corporations may be appropriate. However, they acknowledge
that such adjustments may be too complex for publicly held corporations.

95

This method is more flexible because it could be designed to select which corporate tax preferences would be
passed through to the shareholder. As in the Australian system, not all tax preferences need to receive

integration benefits each year.
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allocated to the stock in a manner similar to the flow-through method. This alternative would
extend the benefits only to retained earnings; however, it also would add significant complexity
to the implementation of this method.
Intercorporate Dividends
4.50 If the dividends-received deduction were not repealed, corporations would receive a double
benefit, being allowed both a deduction and a credit for the dividends received. To avoid this
double benefit, corporate shareholders entitled to the shareholder credit should not be entitled to
a dividends-received deduction.
State Taxation
4.51 Federal adoption of a shareholder-credit method should not affect state corporate tax
administration, because the corporate taxable income base does not change. However, if states
did not adopt integration, adjustments would be needed to eliminate the gross up of the credit at
the shareholder level. Complexities or loss of revenue could arise under the shareholder-credit
method if states do adopt integration.
Level of Compliance
4.52 A shareholder credit system would probably enjoy a high level of taxpayer compliance
because the shareholder must report the dividend income before the credit can be claimed.
Therefore, shareholders would have an incentive to report income, particularly if the credit could
be offset against taxes on other income or is refundable.
Changes to Prior Income
4.53 Adjustment made to a corporation's prior-year tax liability (for example, because of an IRS
audit or the filing of an amended tax return) should not cause problems if there is a fixed rate of
credit. Since changes in a prior year's tax liability will not change the fixed rate, the credit should
not be affected. However, if the method computes the credit on the basis of each corporation's
effective tax rate, and if corporate adjustments were to change the effective tax rate, difficulties
could arise, since a corresponding change in the credit rate would occur. The change in the credit
would require recomputation in the tax liability of all the corporation's shareholders, a process that
could be overwhelming to administer. Most other countries that have adopted a shareholder-credit
system of integration have avoided this problem by using a flat rate for the credit.
Transition
4.54 Several transitional issues would need to be considered in adopting a shareholder-credit
method. These issues include whether credits would be imputed to existing equity investments
and whether credits would be granted for distributions of pre-enactment earnings. Limiting credits
only to holders of newly issued equity or to distributions only from post-enactment earnings would
add complexities to the implementation of the method.
Advantages and Disadvantages
4.55

The following are the advantages of the shareholder-credit method:
•

It allows for easy implementation when a fixed credit rate is used.
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•

It interfaces easily with systems in other countries.

•

Its administration benefits from international experience.

•

It adapts easily and is more flexible than other methods.

•

It simplifies denial of benefits to special categories of shareholders.

•

It ensures a high level of compliance.

•

It provides integration benefits at the shareholder level.

•

It creates no problems when a prior year's tax liability is adjusted, if a fixed credit rate
is used.

The following are its disadvantages:
•

It introduces complexities when a credit rate other than a fixed rate is used.

•

It does not pass through corporate tax preferences if the credit rate equals the
corporation's effective tax rate.

OTHER METHODS
4.56 Three other methods that have been studied are the repeal of corporate tax, the split-rate
corporate-level tax, and the dividend-exclusion method. These three methods are variations of the
flow-through, dividends-paid deduction, and shareholder-credit methods, respectively.
As
discussed below, careful consideration of these three methods reveals that they are not as
effective or flexible as their principal counterparts in implementing integration of the corporate and
individual tax systems. Therefore, the AICPA does not recommend that any of these methods of
integration be adopted.
Repeal of The Corporate Tax
4.57 Integration can be achieved by repealing the corporate income tax but continuing to tax
shareholders on distributions of corporate earnings. Repealing the corporate tax would produce
results similar to the flow-through method in that the tax burden would be borne entirely at the
shareholder level. The principal difference, however, is that the repeal of the corporate tax would
require that shareholders report income only when corporate earnings are distributed. Under the
flow-through method, corporate earnings would be taxed currently at the shareholder level whether
or not distributed.
4.58 Although repealing the corporate tax would greatly simplify the tax system, it also would
encourage corporations to accumulate earnings, leading to some of the same disadvantages and
complex anti-abuse provisions that exist in the current system, such as the accumulated earnings
tax and the personal holding company tax.
Split-Rate Corporate-Level Tax
4.59 A split-rate tax method of integration would allow corporations to pay a lower rate of tax
on distributed income than on earnings retained at the corporate level. This method has virtually
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the same characteristics as a dividends-paid deduction method; however, it would provide only
a partial benefit for the amount of dividends paid.
4.60 A split-rate tax would not entirely eliminate the distinction between debt and equity,
because the system would not treat the deduction for interest expense the same as dividend
payments. However, the differences between debt and equity could be narrowed. Because
distributed earnings would receive preferential tax treatment, corporations might be pressured to
make larger distributions. Tax-exempt and foreign shareholders would receive no special benefits
under this system. The same complexities that would arise under the dividends-paid deduction
method for both foreign tax credits and other corporate tax preferences also would arise under this
method. Because of the problems noted above, implementation of such a method may not be
advisable.
Dividend-Exclusion Method
4.61 The dividend-exclusion method would eliminate the double tax on distributed corporate
income by allowing shareholders to exclude dividends from income. Income at the corporation
level, however, would continue to be fully taxed. This method would produce results similar to
a shareholder-credit method that neither allows refundable credits nor imposes a compensatory
tax.
4.62 To limit tax-free dividend treatment to distributions paid out of income that is fully taxed
at the corporate level, the corporation would be required to track such income. Only dividends
that were paid out of fully taxed income would qualify for the exclusion at the shareholder level.
This tracking of fully taxed income would be similar to the tracking mechanism required under a
shareholder-credit method that limits the credit to taxes actually paid at the corporate level.
4.63 By taxing income fully at the corporate level, the dividend-exclusion method would achieve
the same results with respect to tax-exempt and foreign shareholders and the pass-through of
corporate tax preferences as a shareholder-credit method that allowed a nonrefundable credit
based on the corporation's effective tax rate. Also, like the shareholder-credit method, the
dividend-exclusion method would not extend integration benefits to retained earnings unless
special provisions were adopted.
4.64 Although the dividend-exclusion method and the shareholder-credit method would produce
substantially equivalent results, the credit method was found to be preferable for several reasons.
First, the credit method would achieve horizontal and vertical equity because corporate income
would be taxed at the shareholder's tax rate, whereas the dividend-exclusion method would tax
income at the corporation's tax rate, and therefore would not achieve one of the basic objectives
of integration (i.e., uniform taxation of income earned in the corporate and noncorporate sectors).
Moreover, the dividend-exclusion method would discriminate against low-bracket shareholders,
who would be taxed on distributed corporate profits at the same effective rate (zero percent) as
high-bracket taxpayers. 96
4.65 Currently, the lack of horizontal and vertical equity under a dividend-exclusion method is
less significant because the present corporate and highest individual tax rates are approximately
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The 1992 Treasury Report suggests that if policymakers desire to tax distributed corporate income at
shareholder rates, the dividend-exclusion method could be structured to allow a tax credit that would refund
all or part of the excess tax collected on corporate income distributed to low-bracket shareholders. This
solution would seem to be tantamount to the adoption of a shareholder credit. See Richard Goode, "Integration
of Corporate and individual Taxes: A Treasury Report," Tax Notes (March 30, 1992), 1668.
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equal. However, these rate structures could be changed by future legislation. In such an event,
the adoption of the shareholder-credit method would allow corporate profits to be taxed at the
same rate as profits earned in the noncorporate sector.
4.66 A second advantage of the shareholder-credit method is that it would more easily interface
with the many integrated foreign tax systems that have adopted the credit method. This
comparability between a U.S. integrated system and foreign integrated systems would facilitate
treaty negotiations on obtaining reciprocal integration benefits for U.S. shareholders.
4.67 Finally, the shareholder-credit method should be no more complicated to implement and
administer than a dividend-exclusion method. 97 In fact, if the shareholder-credit method were
to employ either a flat-rate credit or a compensatory tax, it might be less complicated to administer
than the dividend-exclusion method.
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The 1992 Treasury Report advocates the adoption of the dividend-exclusion method rather than the
shareholder-credit method because of its simplicity and ease of administration. However, in its report, the
Treasury compares the dividend-exclusion method with the credit method adopted by New Zealand in 1988.
The New Zealand method is arguably the most complicated form of the credit method.

42

Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1
Each of the three principal methods has been evaluated to determine whether it achieves
five basic objectives for an integrated system and whether and how easily it can be designed to
handle certain key issues. Each of these principal methods would achieve more neutral taxation
by (1) providing more uniform taxation of income between the corporate and noncorporate sectors;
(2) reducing the tax bias favoring debt investment; and (3) reducing the incentives to retain rather
than distribute earnings. Accordingly, the AICPA believes that an integration method must be
chosen primarily on the basis of its ease of administration, its compatibility with foreign integrated
systems, and its flexibility in addressing the key issues of tax preferences, tax-exempt investors,
and international transactions.
5.2
Theoretically, the flow-through method is the purest form of integration; however, it would
be considerably more difficult to administer and implement. Broadening the eligibility of the S
corporation election by expanding the number of allowable shareholders would offer one
alternative to the use of the flow-through method, but the use of the S corporation rules would
not be practical for large, widely held corporations. 98 Moreover, if policymakers were to decide
not to extend integration benefits to tax-exempt and foreign shareholders, the flow-through
method would need to include an appropriate withholding mechanism, further complicating
implementation of the method. After careful review, the flow-through method was not chosen
as a viable option because of the numerous problems in administering the method, its lack of
flexibility in dealing with the key issues, and its incompatibility with foreign integrated systems.
5.3
Both of the other t w o alternatives, the dividends-paid deduction and the shareholder-credit
methods, would offer a more practical and realistic means of achieving integration. The public's
perception of the equity of each method may be an important factor in determining whether either
is adopted. The public may perceive that the dividends-paid deduction method would confer all
of the benefits on the corporation. The shareholder-credit method is likely to be more acceptable,
since the public may perceive that the shareholder would receive a greater benefit than under the
current system or the dividends-paid deduction method. On the other hand, the public may
perceive that integration benefits only high-income taxpayers.
5.4
The United States could adopt either the deduction or the credit method with substantially
the same tax results.99 However, to achieve this equality, it must be assumed that the
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While the existing flow-through integration method now applicable to S corporations may deal appropriately
with the greatest number of corporations, it is not practicable for larger, publicly held corporations. Although
expansion of S corporation eligibility would be beneficial, another integration method must be adopted for large
corporations if the benefits of integration are to be extended to that sector of the American economy.
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For example:
Corporate Level
Net income
Cash dividend
Dividend deduction
Taxable income

Credit

Deductions

$1,000
660
0
1,000

$1,000
1,000
1,000
0
(footnote continued on page 44)
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corporate-dividend policy would be comparable under both methods. In addition, the deduction
method would be assumed to include a withholding mechanism and credits under both methods
would be refundable.
5.5
Proponents of the dividend-paid deduction method argue that (1) it is simpler and easier to
administer than the shareholder-credit system, (2) it handles the debt-equity problem more
effectively, and (3) it can more easily restrict integration benefits to new equity. The simplicity
and ease of administration of the dividends-paid deduction method is its most significant
advantage. However, the modifications (including withholding) required to implement adjustments
for foreign and tax-exempt shareholders, credits, and tax preferences would complicate this
method greatly. Without these modifications, greater revenue loss, reduced compliance, and a
decrease in the value of tax preferences could result. Consequently, such a modified deduction
method would provide no significant advantages over a shareholder-credit method.
5.6
Another advantage of the dividends-paid deduction method is that it would provide for more
neutral tax treatment of debt and equity. The shareholder-credit method would not achieve the
same result, since the shareholders, not the corporation, would receive the benefits of integration.
Therefore, under the credit method, corporations may continue to prefer debt because interest
would be deductible, whereas dividends would not.
5.7
Proponents of the shareholder-credit method argue that it is preferable to the dividends-paid
deduction method because (1) it would achieve a higher level of compliance with less effort, (2)
it would be more flexible in dealing with foreign and tax-exempt shareholders and corporate tax
preferences, (3) it would more easily conform with the integrated systems of other countries, and
(4) it would not affect the corporation's financial statements.
5.8
The shareholder-credit method should have a higher level of compliance than the
dividends-paid deduction method, unless the deduction method includes a withholding mechanism.
The level of compliance would be higher under the credit method because taxpayers would report
dividend income before receiving the benefit of the credit, whereas under the deduction method,
the corporation would be permitted to take a deduction for dividends even if some shareholders
failed to report the dividend income.
5.9
The shareholder-credit method can more easily be designed either to extend or to limit benefits for foreign and tax-exempt shareholders, and either to pass through or to limit the
pass-through of tax preferences to shareholders. Although the deduction method, too, can be designed to address these issues, the credit system would handle them with far less complexity.
A special provision for corporate tax preferences would make both methods more complex, but
implementation of rules relating to tax preferences would be more difficult under the dividends-paid
deduction method.
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(continued)

Corporate tax (34%)
Withholding tax (31%)
Shareholder Level
Cash dividend received
Gross-up inclusion
Shareholder income
Tax before credit
Credit
Refundable credit

340
0

0
310

$660

$690

340

310

1,000

1,000

310
340

310
310
0

(30)

Net Cash to Shareholder

$690
44

$690

5.10 If policymakers decide not to extend integration benefits to tax-exempt shareholders, the
shareholder-credit method could make the credit nonrefundable to tax-exempt organizations,
whereas the dividends-paid deduction method would have to tax dividends as unrelated trade or
business income (or include a withholding mechanism) to achieve the same result. Making the
credit nonrefundable is easier to implement, and certainly less complex, than requiring withholding
or taxing dividends as unrelated trade or business income.
5.11 The shareholder-credit method also can be more easily tailored to other specific types of
shareholders. This feature is especially important when determining the proper treatment of
foreign shareholders, and may be the reason why other countries have preferred the shareholder
credit instead of the deduction method. 100 Conversely, the main drawback to the dividends-paid
deduction method is that it would apply to all categories of shareholders equally. Under the credit
method, the United States could make the credit nonrefundable to foreign shareholders and extend
integration benefits to foreign shareholders only through bilateral treaty negotiations. The only
way to prevent the granting of integration benefits to foreign shareholders under the deduction
method would be to increase the withholding rate on dividends paid to such shareholders.
However, such an increase could be very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve under the
provisions of many existing tax treaties.
5.12 Another advantage of the shareholder-credit system is that it would not change the amount
of net income a corporation reports in its financial statements. Because the corporate income tax
liability would not change under this method, there would be no consistency problems with
reporting the prior year's operations and cash flows, such as those that would occur under the
deduction method.
5.13 International conformity, however, may be the most important advantage of the
shareholder-credit method. All other major industrialized nations that have adopted integration use
this method. This international experience not only would benefit the United States in designing
and implementing an integration system, it also would make it easier to interface the U.S. system
with foreign systems. Adopting the shareholder-credit method also would facilitate bilateral treaty
negotiations on providing reciprocal integration benefits.
5.14 In summary, since both the credit and deduction methods can be structured to produce
substantially equivalent tax results, the United States should consider other advantages and
disadvantages when selecting the appropriate method. The single most important factor in this
decision seems to be the international ramifications, particularly the method's ability to work
within the framework of bilateral tax treaties. Flexibility in treaty negotiations, particularly in
dealing with foreign tax credits and the extension of integration benefits to foreign shareholders,
would give the credit system a decisive advantage.
5.15 The shareholder credit also would allow for greater flexibility in handling the key policy
issues involved in the treatment of tax preferences and tax-exempt investors. This flexibility
would facilitate the adoption of an integrated system, because it would more easily allow policymakers to reach the compromises that necessarily are a part of the legislative process. Although
some forms of the shareholder-credit method may be relatively complicated to implement, international experience suggests that even the most complex forms of the method can be administered without substantial difficulty.
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See Avi-Yonah, "The Treatment of Corporate Preference Items Under an Integrated Tax System: A
Comparative Analysis," 198.
45

5.16 On balance, the AICPA concludes that the shareholder-credit method best achieves the
objectives of an integrated system, and therefore recommends its adoption by the United States.
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APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE BUSINESS INCOME TAX

A.1
The Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) prototype, recommended in the Treasury
report Integration of The Individual and Corporate Tax Systems, would virtually eliminate
distinctions between debt and equity investment, and it would tax corporate and noncorporate
businesses alike. Under CBIT, payments of interest or dividends would not be deductible by a
CBIT entity,* but the payments would generally be excluded from the investor's income. Thus,
the income would be taxed at the CBIT entity's rate and not at the progressive rates applicable
to the individual recipients of the dividends or interest income.
A.2
The CBIT prototype is comprehensive in that it would apply to virtually all businesses†
without regard to the legal form in which a business conducts its activities. Thus, corporations,
S corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships would all be subject to the same system of
taxation.
A.3
Tax preference income would be prevented from passing through to shareholders by means
of an excludable distributions account (EDA). The EDA would track income that has been fully
taxed, ‡ and distributions from the EDA would be excludable from the income of investors.
Amounts distributed in excess of the EDA would be subject to either a compensatory tax at the
corporate level or would be taxable to the investors.
A.4
Foreign-source income of the CBIT entity would continue to be subject to the foreign tax
credit. However, such income would be treated similarly to preference income, because foreignsource income that was not subject to U.S. tax as a result of receiving the benefit of the foreign
tax credit would not increase the EDA. With regard to foreign investors in U.S. CBITs, the
proposal would eliminate withholding on dividends and interest.
A.5
The CBIT proposal would not change the taxation of interest that was not paid by a CBIT
entity. Thus, home mortgage interest and investment interest would remain deductible.
A.6
Because all businesses would be subject to the same system of taxation, the reorganization
provisions found in subchapter C would have to be extended to partnerships and sole
proprietorships in order to provide for the carryover of EDA's when entities are combined.
Distributions of appreciated property by partnerships and sole proprietorships would likely trigger
entity-level taxable income and an increase in basis. Alternatively, some provisions may be made
for carryover basis with regard to such distributions.

*

†

‡

CBIT entity in this context refers not only to corporations and partnerships but also to sole proprietorships that
are subject to CBIT.
There would be a small business exception for businesses with gross receipts of less than $ 100,000.
The annual addition to the EDA is calculated by the following formula: U.S. tax paid for the taxable year
divided by the corporate tax rate, less U.S. tax paid for the taxable year, plus equity distributions and interest

received from CBIT entities.
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APPENDIX B

THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE DISTRIBUTION LEVELS ON EFFECTIVE TAX
RATES UNDER CURRENT LAW AND ALTERNATIVE TAX INTEGRATION METHODS

B.1
This appendix sets forth a comparison of the tax effect on corporate distribution levels
under the current tax system and under three alternative integration methods — the flow-through
method, the dividends-paid deduction method, and the shareholder-credit method.
The
calculations reflect the current individual and corporate tax rate structure (31 percent and 34
percent, respectively).
B.2
In the current double-tax environment, effective tax rates on distributed income depend on
the combination of corporate and individual tax rates, as well as on the amount of income
distributed. Assuming full retention of earnings by the corporation, the system levies a tax only
at the corporate level (34 percent at current rates). The combined shareholder-corporate tax
increases to 44.23 percent when the corporation distributes 50 percent of its earnings. When the
corporation distributes all of its after-tax earnings, the combined tax rate increases to 54.46
percent. This increase in effective tax rates demonstrates the current system's bias against
distributing corporate earnings.
B.3
The greatest change in effective tax rates from the current system would occur under the
flow-through method of integration, because the effective tax rate under this method (which is
analogous to current partnership and S corporation taxation) equals the shareholder tax rate
irrespective of the amount of corporate distributions. Distributions do not affect the tax rate, and
therefore would be a neutral consideration from a tax-effect standpoint, other than as a source of
funds with which to pay the tax. In addition, since this method would tax all income at the
shareholder level, the corporate tax would become unnecessary.
B.4
Somewhere between the effects of the double-tax system and the effects of the
flow-through method of integration lie the effects of the dividends-paid deduction and the
shareholder-credit methods, both of which result in the same effective tax rate in most situations.
Under the latter t w o methods, the change in effective tax rates depends on the amount of
corporate distributions. The greater the level of distribution, the more the combined effective tax
rate shifts from the corporate rate to the shareholder rate. The effective tax rate under both
methods equals 34 percent when the corporation retains 100 percent of its earnings, the same
rate as under the current system. Assuming the tax credit can be used to shelter tax on income
other than the dividend on which the credit is earned, the combined effective tax rate gravitates
toward the shareholder tax rate in direct proportion to the level of distribution under either method
(for example, a 32.5 percent combined effective tax rate assuming a 50 percent level of
distribution, and a 31 percent combined effective tax rate assuming a 100 percent level of
distribution).
B.5
If the shareholder credit cannot be used to offset tax on income other than the dividend
itself, and the corporate tax rate exceeds the shareholder tax rate, the combined effective tax rate
would equal the corporate tax rate, notwithstanding the level of distribution. In this case, the
dividends-paid deduction and the shareholder-credit methods will produce different effective tax
rates.
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Summary Comparison*

Effective Tax Rates

After-Tax Income
Distribution Percentage
0%
50%
100%

*

Full
Dividend
Deduction

Present
Law
34%
44.23%
54.46%

34%
32.5%
31%

Full
Shareholder
Credit
34%
34% †
34%‡

FlowThrough
Method
31 %
31%
31%

This summary assumes the following:
Corporate tax rate
Shareholder tax rate
Corporate pre-tax income
†

31 %
31 %
$1,000

Assumes a nonrefundable credit. If shareholder credit is allowed to shelter tax on income from sources other
than the dividend giving rise to credit, the effective tax rate is 32.5%.

‡ Assumes a nonrefundable credit. If shareholder credit is allowed to shelter tax on income from sources other
than the dividend giving rise to credit, the effective tax rate is 3 1 % .
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0% Income Distribution
Full
Dividend
Deduction

Full
Shareholder
Credit

FlowThrough
Method

1,000
0

1,000
340
660

1,000
0
0
1,000
340
660

1,000
0
0
0
0
1,000

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0
0
0

0

0

0

1,000
310
0
310

340

340

340

310

34.00%

34.00%

34.00%

31.00%

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

310

0

0

0

(310)

340

340

340

310

34.00%

34.00%

34.00%

31.00%

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

310

0

0

0

(310)

Present
Law
Corporate Level
Net income
Dividends paid
Dividend deduction
Taxable income
Tax (34%)
Retained earnings
Individual Level
Dividends received
Gross up
Taxable income
Tax before credit (31 %)
Credit
Tax after credit

Total tax with
refundable credit
Effective rate with
refundable credit
Cash Flow to Individual
With Refundable Credit
Dividends paid to
individual
Tax to individual
after credits
Cash Flow

Total tax without
refundable credit
Effective rate without
refundable credit
Cash Flow to Individual
Without Refundable Credit
Dividends paid to
individual
Tax to individual
after credit
Cash Flow

1,000
0

50

1,000
340
660

0

50% Income Distribution
Full
Dividend
Deduction

Full
Shareholder
Credit

FlowThrough
Method

1,000
330

1,000
340
330

1,000
500
500
500
170
330

1,000
500
0
0
0
500

330

500

330
102

500
155

102

Present
Law
Corporate Level
Net income
Dividends paid
Dividend deduction
Taxable income
Tax (34%)
Retained earnings
Individual Level
Dividends received
Gross up
Taxable income
Tax before credit (31 %)
Credit
Tax after credit

1,000
330

1,000
340
330

155

330
170
500
155
170
(15)

1,000
310
0
310

442

325

325

310

44.23%

32.50%

32.50%

31.00%

330

500

330

500

102

155

Cash Flow

228

345

345

Total tax without
refundable credit

442

325

340

310

44.23%

32.50%

34.00%

31.00%

330

500

330

500

102

155

0

310

228

345

330

190

Total tax with
refundable credit
Effective rate with
refundable credit
Cash Flow to Individual
With Refundable Credit
Dividends paid to
individual
Tax to individual
after credits

Effective rate without
refundable credit
Cash Flow to Individual
Without Refundable Credit
Dividends paid to
individual
Tax to individual
after credits
Cash Flow
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(15)

500

310
190

100% Income Distribution
Full
Dividend
Deduction

Full
Shareholder
Credit

FlowThrough
Method

1,000
660

1,000
340
0

1,000
1,000
1,000
0
0
0

1,000
1,000
0
0
0
0

660

1,000

660
205

1,000
310

205

310

660
340
1,000
310
340
(30)

545

310

310

310

54.46%

31.00%

31.00%

31.00%

660

1,000

660

1,000

205

310

445

690

690

690

545

310

340

310

54.46%

31.00%

34.00%

31.00%

660

1,000

660

1,000

205

310

0

310

455

690

660

690

Present
Law
Corporate Level
Net income
Dividends paid
Dividend deduction
Taxable income
Tax (34%)
Retained earnings
Individual Level
Dividends received
Gross up
Taxable income
Tax before credit (31 %)
Credit
Tax after credit

Total tax with
refundable credit
Effective rate with
refundable credit
Cash Flow to Individual
With Refundable Credit
Dividends paid to
individual
Tax to individual
after credits'
Cash Flow

Total tax without
refundable credit
Effective rate without
refundable credit
Cash Flow to Individual
Without refundable credit
Dividends paid to
individual
Tax to individual
after credits
Cash Flow

1,000
660
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1,000
340
0

(30)

1,000
1,000
310
0
310

310

APPENDIX C
DEGREE OF REDUCTION OF ECONOMIC DOUBLE
TAXATION IN OECD COUNTRIES

Elimination of economic double taxation

None or very little
reduction
Reduction of economic double taxation
Shareholder Level

Corporate Level
1
Classical system(1)

Belgium (2)

5

Shareholder level

6

7

2

3

Split rate
system

Partial dividend
deduction system

Partial imputation
system

Partial
shareholder relief
schemes

Zero rate system

Full imputation system
of full shareholder
relief system

Lower tax
rule on
distributed
income

Partial deduction
of dividends paid

Partial credit for
corporate tax paid

Partial credit for
domestic
shareholders

Zero tax rate on
distributed income

Full credit for corporate
tax paid (imputation
system)

France (7)

Austria

Greece

Australia

Norway

Finland

Germany (3) Iceland (4)

4

Corporate level

Luxembourg

Spain (5)

Ireland

Canada

Netherlands

Sweden (6)

United Kingdom

Denmark

Germany (3X9)

Switzerland

Iceland (4)

Italy

United States

Japan

New Zealand

Portugal

Turkey (10)

Turkey (10)
1.

In most of these countries (and in those with reduction at the corporate level) some small degree of reduction is given to shareholders in the form of
a relatively low exemption for dividends received.

2.

Belgium has moved from a shareholder relief system to a classical system but continues to provide relief to shareholders who invest their dividends
in their own professional activity (the use of a so-called mitigation technique to encourage retentions rather than distribution).

3.

Systems in column nos. 2 and 7 are both operative in Germany.

4.

The deductions for dividends paid may in some cases fully offset the corporate income tax and also the personal income tax, especially for dividends up
to 15 percent of capital value. Dividends exceeding this limit are fully taxed at both levels. Hence, Iceland is classified both under columns 3 and 5.

5.

Spain should, strictly speaking, be shown under column 5 as well as column 3, but as the credit to the shareholder is only 10 percent (and much lower
than other countries in column 5) it has been disregarded on de minimis grounds.

6.

The deduction for dividends paid may in some cases result in elimination of the corporate tax (for dividends on newly issued shares, maximum 10
percent per year of the value of the issue with as overall maximum equal to the total value of the issue).

7.

France is sometimes described as having approached elimination rather than mitigation of the economic double taxation, as shown in the table, because
whilst the rate of corporation tax has been substantially reduced, the amount of credit has not changes, but on the other hand, since 1989 retained
profits have become subject to a lower rate than distributed profits (currently 3 4 and 4 2 percent respectively).

8.

As from 1986 dividends paid to residents are taxed at half the normal rate in the hands of the shareholder. The split rate system (column 2) was
abolished as from 1 9 8 9 .

9.

Germany belongs to the extreme right of the table in over-compensating for the economic double taxation of dividends by giving both full imputation
to the shareholder and subjecting distributed profits to a lower corporate rate than retained profits. On the other hand, no credit to the shareholder
is given for the payment of the local business tax.

10. No personal tax is charged on dividends distributed out of profits which have borne corporation tax which means in practice that the relief is sometimes
partial, sometimes complete. This is why Turkey is shown in both columns 5 and 7.
Source: Taxing Profits in a Global Economy: Domestic and International Issues. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (January 1992), 57.
Reprint permission granted.

53

APPENDIX D
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOREIGN TAX SYSTEMS
FOR THE COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE AICPA STUDY
D.1
The following schedule presents the important characteristics of the corporate tax systems
in Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, and Australia. Also included in
the schedule are the individual income and capital gain tax rates and characteristics of the
integration system adopted in each country.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN TAX SYSTEMS

AUSTRALIA

CANADA

FRANCE

GERMANY

ITALY

JAPAN

39%

28.84% (A)

34%

36%

36%

51.38%

33% (T)

39%

28.84% (A)

34%

50%

36%

51.38%

33% (T)

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

(K)

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

(AA)
Taxable

(B)
Taxable

(E)
Taxable

(L)
Taxable

(N)
Taxable

(B)
Taxable

(Q)
Taxable

Combined
Yes

(C)
No

(F)
No

Combined
No

Combined
No

Combined
No

Combined
Yes

21.25% (BB)
48.25% (BB)
Note 7

26.35% (Y)
46.40% (Y)
Note 1

5%
56.8%
Note 2

19%
53%
Note 3

10%
50%
Note 4

15%
65% (P)
Note 5

25% (W)
40%
Note 6

Full (CC)
Shareholder
credit

Partial (D)
Shareholder
credit

Full (G)
Shareholder
credit

Full
Shareholder
credit

Full
Shareholder
credit

Partial
Shareholder
credit

Partial
Advance
corporation
tax (ACT)

39%

16.67%

33.33%

36%

36%

6.4%-12.8% (Z)

25%

Rebate (DD)

Exclusion

Creditor 95%
Exclusion (X)

Credit

Credit

Exclusion

Exclusion

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

(R)

No
No

No
No

Yes (H)
(I)

No
No

No
No

Exempt
No

Yes
(S)

Dividend relief to individual
shareholder

Credit

Credit

Credit (V)

Credit

Credit

Credit

Credit

Refundable Credit
* Domestic shareholder?
• Foreign shareholder?

No
No

No
No

Yes
(I)

Yes
No(U)

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
(S)

(J)

(M)

(O)

UK

Corporate Income Tax System
Characteristics
Tax rate on distributed income
(ordinary)
Tax rate on undistributed income
(ordinary)
Taxability of interest on Debt
of state/local governments
Double tax relief for foreignsource income (nonhaven)
Taxation of capital gains
Capital gains combined with
ordinary income or separate
(rate)
Basis indexation
Individual Income Tax Rates
Lowest (above tax-free amount)
Highest
Taxation of capital gains
Characteristics of Integration
System
Degree of integration redistributed income
Method of tax integration

Rate (credit as percentage of
grossed up dividend)
Dividend relief to corporate
shareholder
Refundable credit
• Regular corporation with
offsetting expenses or losses?
» Tax exempt shareholder (e.g.,
pension trust or charity)?
• Foreign shareholder?

COMMENTS:
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A

— The Canadian federal government imposes tax at the rate of 2 8 % plus a surtax of 3% of
tax. Each of the provincial governments then levies tax on corporate income earned in
the province, typically at about 15%, giving a combined rate of about 4 4 % .

B

— Unilateral relief by foreign tax credit; treaty relief by exclusion or rate reduction.

C

— Income is combined with ordinary income, but only 75% of gain is included in the tax
base.

D

— At the federal level, the shareholder credit is equal to 16.67% of dividends received.
When the reduction in provincial tax is taken into account, the total credit is about 25%
of the dividend received. The tax credit at the shareholder level does not, however, fully
offset the tax paid by the corporation on the income.

E

— 9 5 % of gross dividend (i.e., net dividend plus tax credit in respect of foreign withholding
tax) from 10% or more-owned affiliates is exempt. Otherwise, foreign tax credit
corresponding to foreign withholding tax only under treaty provisions.

F

— Combined (i) for gains from sales of assets held less than t w o years, (ii) for recapture of
depreciation, and (iii) for sale of some securities; separate for gains from sales of assets
held t w o years or more. Gains from sales of assets held for more than t w o years are
subject to taxation at 18% rate. As a condition for the favorable treatment, a reserve
must be booked for the after-tax capital gains (82%). If this reserve is subsequently
distributed, the tax benefit of the reduced rate is recaptured.

G

— Dividends are basically paid to shareholders out of after-tax profits. A tax credit [avoir
fiscal) is attached to the net dividend received by resident shareholders, equal to 5 0 % of
that net dividend. However, under treaty provisions, the avoir fiscal tax credit can be
attributed to nonresident shareholders (generally to individuals or nonparent corporations).
Shareholders are subject to individual or corporate income tax on the gross dividend (i.e.,
net-dividend plus tax credit). The tax credit can then be offset against the shareholder's
total tax liability.
For corporate shareholders, 95% of gross dividends received (net dividend plus tax credit)
is exempt where the distributing company is owned 10% or more. This applies to both
French-source and foreign-source dividends.

H

— The avoir fiscal tax credit is refundable to pension funds and charitable organizations
recognized as fulfilling a public interest.

I

— Generally, foreign shareholders do not benefit from the avoir fiscal tax credit, except
under treaty provisions. The tax credit can also be refundable under treaty provisions.
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J

— Precompte equalization tax is due by the distributing company upon distribution of income
on which corporate tax at 3 4 % has not been levied (e.g., income from foreign permanent
establishments or dividends from affiliates owned 10% or more). Precompte tax is equal
to the avoir fiscal tax credit. Tax credits attached to redistributed dividends (i.e., avoir
fiscal or tax credits in respect of foreign withholding taxes under treaty provisions) can
be offset against precompte tax.

K

— Limited exemption for certain special-purpose bonds (e.g., low-income housing bonds).
Otherwise taxable.

L

— Income received from affiliates owned 10% or more is exempt. Otherwise, foreign tax
credit.

M

— Penalty taxes apply on distribution of exempt income. This funds credit given to
shareholder. Municipal trade tax (average rate approximately 1 7 % , deductible for
computing corporate tax) is not subject to corporate/shareholder tax integration; however,
dividends received from 10% or more-owned subsidiaries are not subject to trade tax.
Note that the exemption is only granted if the participation of 10% or more has been held
for a period of at least twelve months before the end of the fiscal year.

N

— Tax credit and tax deduction of 60% of the profits distributed to Italian corporations by
related companies that are not resident in Italy and are owned for an amount not less than
2 0 % of their capital stock (10% if such foreign companies are public-listed).

O

— Equalization tax at the rate of 56.25% (36/64) in case of distribution of income exempt
from corporate income tax. This funds credit given to shareholder. Local income tax
(ILOR) at rate of 16.2%, 75% of which is deductible for corporation tax (IRPEG), is not
subject to corporate/shareholder tax integration. Proposed legislation introduced in
September 1992 would make local income tax nondeductible for corporate tax, effective
for calendar year 1992.

P

— Combined national and local tax rate.

Q

— Unilateral relief by foreign tax credit, treaty relief by exclusion, rate reduction or foreign
tax credit.

R

— A refund of the credit is generally not available. A special relief is available, however, if
a company is in a loss position and has surplus receipts of U.K. dividends. The company
"deposits" the loss with the Revenue and the Revenue pays the credit to the company.
When the company pays dividends in the future, ACT is paid, which effectively repays
the tax credit and the losses are reinstated.

S

— Generally not refundable but by treaty may be refunded subject to application of
withholding tax on refund and underlying dividend. U.S.-U.K. treaty provides full ACT
refund to U.S. individual and less than 10% corporate shareholders with 15% withholding
tax; corporate 10% or more shareholders receive ACT refund of one-half with 5%
withholding tax.
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T

— The normal rate of corporation tax for companies with profits greater than £1.25 million
is 3 3 % ; however, a special rate, known as the small companies rate, is available for
companies with profits of less than £250,000. For profits between £250,000 and £1.25
million, a tapering relief applies.
If a company is part of a group, these limits are proportionately reduced by the number
of group companies. Therefore, when a company is part of a large worldwide group, the
small companies rate will no longer apply.

U

— Generally, no. However, a refundable credit is available for foreign shareholders if (and
to the extent that) the German corporation distributes foreign-source income to its
non-German shareholders.

V

— A general deduction is applicable both to dividend and interest income. It is not applicable
to dividends received by shareholders holding more than 35 % in the distributing company.
The avoir fiscal credit from dividends that are sheltered from tax by this deduction
remains available for credit.

W

— The basic rate of individual taxation is 25% and this rate determines the rate of advance
corporation tax (ACT). There is a 20% rate applicable to the first £2,000 of taxable
income.

X

— The general regime is to tax the gross dividend and give a credit for the avoir fiscal. In
the case of parent companies, 95% of the subsidiary dividend is excluded from tax, and
no avoir fiscal credit is allowed.

Y

— Represents combined federal and typical provincial tax.

Z

— The dividend is not grossed up by the amount of the credit. A dividend credit equal to
10% and 2.8% of the dividend received is allowed against the national and local taxes
of taxpayers with ordinary income of less than ¥10 million. For taxpayers with ordinary
income in excess of ¥10 million, the credits against national and local taxes are 5% and
1.4%.

AA — Unilateral relief by exemption [in respect of nonportfolio (holdings exceeding 10%)
dividends received by Australian resident corporations] foreign tax credit, treaty relief by
exclusion or rate reduction.
BB

— Resident rates shown. Nonresident rates range from 29% to 4 7 % .

CC — Relief is by way of credit to individual shareholder of corporate tax paid. Intercorporate
dividends are subject to rebate. Dividends paid to nonresidents that carry franking credits
(i.e., dividends that have been paid out of tax-paid profits and are declared to be such)
are exempt from withholding tax.
DD — Tax rebate is available to public companies regardless of the franked status of the
dividend. However, tax rebate is only available in respect of franked dividends (dividends
paid out of tax-paid profits) received by private companies from nongroup companies.
Tax rebate is available in respect of unfranked dividends paid to a private company by a
group company.
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Individual Capital Gains
Note 1 Canada
Canadian tax rules provide for a cumulative tax exemption for capital gains up to a
lifetime limit of C$100,000. Since three-quarters of capital gains are included in income
for tax purposes, the exemption effectively removes tax liability on C$25,000 of capital
gains.
Note 2 France
Gains from the sale of land held for t w o years or less are taxed at normal income tax
rates. Gains from the disposal of land and buildings held for more than t w o years are
adjusted for inflation and then reduced by a percentage for every year of ownership over
t w o years. Exempt items include capital gains arising from the sale of property from a
total holding worth less than FF400,000 and from the sale of the principal residence. An
annual allowance of FF6,000 is deducted from gains otherwise chargeable. Gains on the
sale of stock and shares are taxable at 16% in specific cases.
Note 3

Germany
Long-term gains from the sale of private assets are generally not taxable. Gains realized
on business assets and short-term gains from privately held securities sold within six
months of acquisition and from the sale of real property within t w o years of acquisition
are subject to tax at normal rates. Gains from the sale of securities and real property not
exceeding DM1,000 in a tax year are exempt; losses may be set off against gains arising
in the same year but cannot be carried forward or back. For individuals, capital gains
from the disposal of shares in a corporation by a shareholder of 25% or more or from the
sale of a partnership interest are subject to half the normal income tax rate.

Note 4

Italy
Gains arising from the sale of assets are generally not taxable for individuals, except in
specific cases provided for by the fiscal law, in which case the gain is taxable as ordinary
income (i.e., sales of immovable property within five years of acquisition). An annual
election is provided to compute tax on sales of shares, quotas, convertible debentures,
and option rights either at the rate of 25% of actual net gains or at the rate of 15% on
presumed gains determined by applying specified indices to the sales proceeds.

Note 5 Japan
Personal capital gains are generally included in taxable income and taxed at normal rates.
The taxpayer may deduct ¥500,000 annually from gains on the sale of short-term assets
(those held ten years or less). In the case of long-term assets, half of the gain is taxable.
Gains on the sale of securities are no longer tax-exempt. Capital gains derived from the
transfer of real property are taxed at special rates after certain deductions.
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Note 6 United Kingdom
Net gains exceeding £5,000 per year (after index relief) are taxed as income at the
individual's marginal rate. Private cars, principal private residences, government securities
held for more than twelve months, and certain other assets and transactions are exempt.
Losses may be carried forward indefinitely. Nonresidents are not normally subject to
capital gains tax.
Note 7 Australia
Gains from the sale of cars and principal residence's are exempt. Gains are taxed in year
of disposal but may be averaged over five years to obtain a more favorable tax rate by
taking advantage of individual lower marginal tax rates in those years (averaging is
achieved by dividing the amount of the capital gain by five, calculating the amount of tax
on that amount, and multiplying that amount of tax by five).
Capital losses may only be offset against capital gains, but may be carried forward
indefinitely.
Special rules apply to personal-use assets, including a threshold of A$5,000 and
limitations on the offset of losses.
Cost base of assets used in calculating the gain is indexed for inflation, unless the asset
is held for less than twelve months.
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APPENDIX E

COMPARISON OF THE TAX INTEGRATION METHODS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

E.1
This appendix includes a comparison of the tax integration methods adopted by Canada,
Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, and Australia. A separate calculation has
been performed for each country. These calculations show the combined corporate and individual
tax burden under the method of integration for both a high rate taxpayer and a low rate taxpayer.
These calculations are based on three different distribution levels.
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AUSTRALIA

Distribution Level
100%
Pretax Income
Corporate Tax @ 3 9 %

50%

0%

100.00

100.00

100.00

<39.00>

<39.00>

<39.00>

Amount Available for Dividend

61.00

Dividend Paid (Net)
Franking Credit

61.00
39.QQ

30.50
19.50

0.00
0.00

100.00

50.00

0.00

48.25
<39.00>

24.13
<19.50>
4.63

0.00
0.00
0.00

39.00
9.25
48.25

39.00
4.63
43.63

39.00
0.00
39.00

22.25
< 39.00 >

11.13
<19.50>
0.00

0.00
0,00
0.00

39.00
0.00
39.00

39.00
0.00
39.00

Gross Dividend

61.00

High Rate Taxpayer
Tax @ 48.25% on gross dividend
Less: franking credit
Net individual tax
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

9.25

Low Rate Taxpayer (resident)
Tax @ 22:25% on gross dividend
Less: franking credit (See Note)
Net individual tax
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

Note:

0.00

39.00
0.00
39.00

Franking credit can offset tax on any other taxable income derived by the shareholder in
the year.
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CANADA

Distribution Level
100%

50%

0%

Pretax Income

100.00

100.00

Corporate Tax @ 4 4 %

< 44.00 >

< 44.00 >

< 44.00 >

56.00

56.00

56.00

Dividend
Add: gross up (25%)
Amount subject to tax

56.00
14.00
70.00

28.00

0.00

7.00

0,00

35.00

0.00

Tax before credit (@46.4%)
Total dividend tax credit
(federal and provincial)
Net individual tax

32.48

16.24

0.00

<14.00>
18.48

<7.00>
9.24

0.00
0.00

44.00

44.00

18.48
62.48

9.24
53.24

Dividend
Add: gross-up (25%)
Amount subject to tax

56.00

28.00

14.00
70.00

7.00
35.00

Tax before credit (@26.35%)
Total dividend tax credit
(federal and provincial)
Net individual tax

18.45

9.22

0.00

<14.00>
4.45

<7,00>
2.22

0,00
0,00

44.00
4.45
48.45

44.00
2.22
46.22

44.00
0.00
44.00

Amount Available for Dividend

100.00

High Rate Taxpayer

Total Tax Burden
Corporate tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

44.00
0.00

44.00

Low Rate Taxpayer

Total Tax Burden
Corporate tax
Net individual tax
Total tax
Note:

0.00
0.00

0.00

Since the provincial tax is a multiple of the federal tax after dividend tax credit in all
provinces except Quebec, the provincial tax system is effectively integrated, and this
schedule combines federal and typical provincial taxes.
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FRANCE

Distribution Level
100%

50%

0%

100.00

100.00

100.00

< 34.00 >

< 34.00 >

< 34.00 >

Amount Available for Dividend

66.00

66.00

66.00

Dividend Paid (net)
Avoir Fiscal
Gross Dividend

66.00
33.00
99.00

33.00
16,50
49.50

0.00
0.00

56.23
< 33.00 >
23.23

28.12
<16.50;>
11.62

0.00
0.00

34.00
23.23
57.23

34.00
11,62
45.62

34.00
0.00

2.47

0.00
0.00

Pretax Income
Corporate Tax @ 3 4 %

0.00

High Rate Taxpayer

Tax at 56.8% on gross dividend
Less: avoir fiscal credit
Net individual tax
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

0.00

34.00

Low Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 5% on gross dividend
Less: imputation credit
Net individual tax < refund >
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

4.95
< 33.00 >
< 28.05 >

<16.50>
<14.03>

0.00

34.00

34.00

< 28.05 >

<14.03>

34.00
0.00

5.95

19.92

34.00
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GERMANY

Distribution Level
100%
Pretax Income*

100.00
<50.00>

Corporate Tax @ 5 0 %
Tax reduction to 3 6 % due to dividend
Net corporation tax

14.00

50%
100.00
< 50.00 >

6,14

0%
100.00
< 50.00 >

< 36.00 >

<43.86>

0.00
< 50.00 >

Amount Available for Dividend

64.00

56.14

50,00

Dividend Paid (net)
Imputation Credit
Gross Dividend

64.00
36.00

28.07

0.00

15.79

0.00

100.00

43.86

0.00

High Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 5 3 % on gross dividend
Less: imputation credit
Net individual tax
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

53.00

23.25

0.00

<36.00>
17.00

<15.79>
7.46

0.00

36.00

43.86

50.00

17,00
53.00

7,46
51,32

50.00

19.00
<36.00>
<17.00>

8.33
<15.79>
<7.46>

0.00

43.86

50.00

<7.46>
36.40

0.00
50.00

0.00

0,00

Low Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 19% on gross dividend
Less: imputation credit
Net individual tax < refund >
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

36.00

<17.00>
19.00

* After municipal trade tax — effective rate averages around 17%.
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0,00
0.00

ITALY

Distribution Level
100%

50%

0%

100.00

100.00

100.00

<37.74>

<37.74>

<37.74>

Amount Available for Dividend

62.26

62.26

62.26

Dividend Paid (net)
Imputation Credit
Gross Dividend

62.26

31.13
17.51
48.64

0.00
0.00
0.00

24.32

0.00

< 17.51 >
6.81

0.00

13.62
37.74
13.62
51.36

37.74
6.81
44.55

37.74
0.00
37.74

9.73
< 35.02 >
< 25.29 >

4.86
<17.51>
<12.65>

0.00
0.00
0.00

37.74

37.74

<25.29>

37.74
<12.65>

12.45

25.09

Pretax Income*
Corporate Tax @ 3 6 % on Taxable
Income of 104.83

35.02
97.28

High Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 5 0 % on gross dividend
Less: imputation credit
Net individual tax
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

48.64
<35.02>

0.00

Low Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 1 0 % on gross dividend
Less: imputation credit
Net individual tax < refund >
Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

0.00
37.74

After local tax at 16.20% rate. For income earned after January 1, 1991, only 75% of the local tax is
deductible. Accordingly, income before local tax of 119.33 is subject to local tax of 19.33, but only 14.50
of the local tax is deductible for national tax purposes. Proposed legislation introduced in September 1992
would make local income tax nondeductible for corporate tax, effective for calendar year 1992.
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JAPAN

Distribution Level
100%
Pretax Income
National Tax (33.30%)
Inhabitant Tax (6.89%)
Enterprise Tax (11.19%)
Total Tax
Amount Available for Dividends

100.00

50%
100.00

0%
100.00

< 33.30 >
<6.89>
<11.19>

<33.30>
<6.89>
<11.19>

< 33.30 >
<6.89>
<11.19>

<51,38>

<51.38>

<51,38>

48.62

48.62 .

Gross dividend

48.62

24.31

0.00

National tax (50%)
Tax credit (5%)
Net national tax

24.31
<2.43>
21.88

12.16
<1.22>
10,94

0.00
0.00
0.00

Inhabitant tax (15%)
Tax credit (1.4%)
Net inhabitant tax

7.29
<0.68>
6.61

3.65
<0.34>
3.31

0.00
0.00
0.00

Net individual tax

28,49

14.25

0.00

Total Tax Burden
Corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

51.38
28.49

51.38
14.25
65.73

51.38
0.00
51.38

48.62

High Rate Taxpayer

Note:

79,87

The capital amount is over yen ¥100 million.
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UNITED KINGDOM

Distribution Level
100%
Pretax Income
Corporate Tax (before ACT credit)
Amount Available for Dividend
Dividend paid (net)
ACT

Gross dividend
Corporation Tax
Less: ACT credit
Net corporation tax

100.00

50%
100.00

0%
100.00

< 33.00 >

<33.00>

< 33.00 >

67.00

67.00

67.00

67.00
22.33
89.33

33.50
11.17
44.67

_0.00_

33.00
<22.33>
10.67

33.00
<11.17>
21.83

33.00
0.00
33.00

35.73

17.87
<11.17>
6.70

0.00

11.17
21.83
6.70

0.00
33.00

0.00
0.00

High Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 4 0 % on gross dividend
Less: ACT credit
Net individual tax
Total Tax Burden
ACT
Net corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax

<22.33>
13.40

22.33
10.67

13.40
46.40

39.70

0.00
0.00

0.00
33.00

Low Rate Taxpayer
Tax at 2 5 % on gross dividend
Less: ACT credit
Net individual tax
Total Tax Burden
ACT
Net corporation tax
Net individual tax
Total tax
Note:

22.33

<22.33>
0.00

22.33
10.67

0,00
33.00

11.17
<11.17>

0.00

11.17
21.83
0.00

33.00

0.00

0.00
0.00

0.00
33.00

0,00
33,00

For illustrative purposes, the low rate taxpayer is assumed to be taxed at the 2 5 % basic
rate of individual taxation since this is the rate which determines the level of ACT.
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